RTF malware analysis — malicious · a000fb4e28dd20cd

MALICIOUS

RTF

96.3 KB First seen: 2024-07-23

MD5: 45b6040d50bff71bd32e8d7a0bc56bd4 SHA-1: a31900774cd49888012a30cde33f83ed3c00391f SHA-256: a000fb4e28dd20cdc71f715a89b67e66053cfbb3297fb9d7e15c59a8f2b8151d

120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The ".objupdate" directive forces the activation of this embedded object, leading to code execution. This is a common technique for delivering secondary payloads, such as downloaders or droppers, which would then fetch and execute further malicious content.

Heuristics 3

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00001ecf.bin` `b0c634b41feedf7c20179a5de869c7a180c1e459c46343c385de4b9937c43b59`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1ECF	1960 bytes

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