Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9fe44964cc4ce1d4…

MALICIOUS

PDF

93.7 KB Created: 2021-07-26 05:42:57 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-09-15
MD5: b14cd09bdf0568a4c0e5afc4d2ed4f0a SHA-1: ee549d47d899ac7d14ff31fd74f5a41b1583eb73 SHA-256: 9fe44964cc4ce1d442a24a4fb18aca0b2615d1957ad31a6a4ec48660a4262ff8
156 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The file was detected as malicious by ML classifiers and ClamAV, indicating a high likelihood of malicious intent. It functions as a link farm, directing users to multiple compromised WordPress sites and other domains, likely to facilitate phishing or malware distribution. No scripts were extracted, but the PDF structure and embedded URLs suggest an attempt to lure users to external resources.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9932

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://www.icslights.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/833f0c095140d12515ff00bad4918e4d/futimamapizejixazix.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://pansophers.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160778d778d976---62268885937.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ckmusicdesign.nl/userfiles/file/kozaxunirekekejojaxuduz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.neslihanonur.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/1fffbceb668d89f878b3654a3b263801/46248836452.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://aldwalia.com/userfiles/files/9677617633.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://quiltingacademy.info/fckeditor/userfiles/file/15456085383.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.unicodesystems.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/l11gg1o26ai5n2uikoqaidn000/vugimutekisovevawu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://decom.pro/admin/ckfinder/userfiles/files/56990994532.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://suapaiatuipelehakefamily.com/clients/80707/File/6446061658.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://akapacha.com/userfiles/file/23819568585.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://constructionone.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a4995697660---1186214483.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://photographerin.agency/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/m6avo3visrqsf5m2hvn9d45ao0/kobokitomikijozim.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://esipro.fr/userfiles/file/40770420644.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://stacjaregeneracja.pl/userfiles/file/livimunazosexira.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://borderpak.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/e40c99df78958231b6800934ba81db1a/57580487480.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://prosquash.by/data/dozukoxapifuwit.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gbeequestriansurfaces.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/0u7fmjce60i6a3mv4tmsvmhifn/42457225835.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.arc-welding.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/qtsug83ijpg01uol5pn36a0t8g/noxalalevexutazemibenokaf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sweetestspaparty.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160af95bdaac0d---6815339469.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pulsrmedia.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a8178f16c0a---3306759518.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://robotics-institute.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5pbjkstkedjj6t1lpv54kg38ht/32834132457.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://monarchwinemerchants.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/9cc5f0386641eb3da4c42c1e54e1fcd9/zotemef.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.melodypods.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a8394c4ccb2---sedotebaf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.deopendeur.org/imgUser/file/64252291136.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://stjconsulting.it/userfiles/files/galugitanawobemuwokevowa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/DOqCt-cVA4I/uplcv?utm_term=what+items+did+perseus+use+to+kill+medusa+how+did+the+secure+these+itemsPDF link annotation
    • http://kioskcondoweb.wpengine.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160751d0a5fca4---gisumepunikazixanumenagaf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000103fe.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x103FE 19716 bytes
SHA-256: 85f73fb7ca47912d441277ffd6126811472f2db54350ae4306b4b5d73494a8f8
font_01_sfnt_off00013581.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x13581 10944 bytes
SHA-256: 76aa645ae1b82278717f971a32431045d1da1c2ed18a8b02896c894f31609b65
font_02_sfnt_off00014ef6.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x14EF6 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1