Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9fd8442bff565e72…

MALICIOUS

PDF

47.9 KB Created: 2020-09-10 23:54:30 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 4ea9811fc303d0a78623d55ca5e9548b SHA-1: 19c8c0f538e144696831851933a3547920c6a486 SHA-256: 9fd8442bff565e72dc1c7e7ab3e0b8711ae0b358fd525348d2f2f6bd8343d001
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains multiple embedded links, with one specifically pointing to a known malicious redirector. The heuristic 'PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK' confirms this, indicating the document's primary purpose is to lead the user to harmful content. Additionally, the 'SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE' heuristic suggests a secondary attempt to trick users into executing commands, further reinforcing the malicious intent. The document body itself is heavily obfuscated and contains a URL that matches the malicious redirector.

Heuristics 4

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.club/wix?keyword=crystal+report+web+viewer+free
    • http://files.somafitnessstudios.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131071019/d35d83ef07.pdf
    • http://files.cottlewolly.com.au/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070792/gidobiju_lazaguvavikuzeb_wenowolifuteri_wininutatefuzos.pdf
    • http://vokisa.merakiskincare.net/uploads/1/3/2/3/132303382/3195423.pdf
    • http://taxuno.cdc-design.net/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606505/damekiduvemudiw.pdf
    • http://fonip.makeupbystar.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132680813/darejobawe-kefeves.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/8365/3535/files/64821835923.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/4017/7314/files/merukezokixeterezu.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/4504/4892/files/zakukajeg.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0438/6629/2389/files/20800765776.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/625844_dbd9aefe053c4d8daa25079bf63e1905.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/4d400c_66a00dd3a5714045a8793e64fdcb02ba.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/3e5d97_bebd064b34e94f41ab2d7b61ee9e7f2f.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/eb5a6a_51633383911d4b5e86cffc575be3d71e.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/948cea_87a64a24eec341cf8694de9695e006d4.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00007c95.bin
67eea5dea4fc75a919b8583167a20a5ae0b228cec6d50349c95619fdc28276ee
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7C95 5192 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00008e67.bin
1efdf068fe7fb8283f1e117465cc1763ec7b7017de72724bdd709d806cce6158
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8E67 10740 bytes