Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9fcc8435ac8254ae…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

1.25 MB
MD5: 4c9867155a69c0e089cbf6e287442798 SHA-1: 72fd5acd0ce33714c3aff9e837af3be0db733800 SHA-256: 9fcc8435ac8254ae9b1dea93cff53098e94d193ea4edef5b5300e7c8f0328d2c
100 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The file is an encrypted OOXML document identified as an exploit carrier. It contains embedded OLE objects, specifically related to Equation Editor, which is a known vector for exploiting vulnerabilities. The default password encryption suggests a common exploit delivery method. No further IOCs were extracted.

Heuristics 3

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.