Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9fc8c44e46a04c54…

MALICIOUS

PDF

39.6 KB Created: 2020-11-05 19:53:53 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-26
MD5: e5557580fd2a12631ebc08eda93388e9 SHA-1: 359781e85e90a73608bf3976b40e7407e4af90e7 SHA-256: 9fc8c44e46a04c54481751f6c2227642c71a4d320de779adb3c7f2a6f614df81
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF file contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to disposable hosting services and appear to be part of an SEO link farm. One critical heuristic identified a link to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains URLs that are also present in the link farm, suggesting the primary purpose is to drive traffic to malicious or deceptive websites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffmen.ru/123?keyword=galaga+unblocked+64 In PDF document text
    • https://vuveresob.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134589217/1588273.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://razulusajo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134467314/1951329.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xuzelakojit.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134593048/8ac1b3837ff6.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bulipabuwalo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/1/134131868/goxoxizi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bameveba.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/1/134108569/venaziduzidoz_kediwasubuzud.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://noloturajikule.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134486045/varil.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rimesozarabef.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131607712/wuloxogujot.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sawalodisixujig.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134490012/tewuwunajuw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tetobalowuw.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134523757/buzuvazokojagejena.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gewosawoma.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739201/vupete-fajawimanagimil-tabibiwanidilaf-nenoweb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dojulukasinu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776790/voramudotunawupiloz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xojerajap.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131384359/2122744.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xekadefu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134597434/mitezasuxawizitiku.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4368222/normal_5f9c1a103f892.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/pugomonapoxuxe/bupaverokukexipugej.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005d98.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5D98 5308 bytes
SHA-256: 5c7ef8ba049f9165ae70bdddb1bf0188473881c3855890496b293ec6c7659e95
font_01_sfnt_off00006fc4.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6FC4 9984 bytes
SHA-256: f9e156fe942af5d7eda227d9320d593d983ee593b4b8c8e6d6adeb2f380c76d9

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