Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9fc417f48eb128d3…

MALICIOUS

PDF

75.0 KB Created: 2021-07-18 08:54:10 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: e330e99a80b932f7a2899741f9d7c4f4 SHA-1: 2795950c77953b8c364982b814c93c382f08c455 SHA-256: 9fc417f48eb128d3fe63a5e282585b310e1c897a614775961b12ea33220ac9ac
204 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is a malicious PDF containing embedded JavaScript, which is likely used to execute further malicious actions. It also features a link farm pointing to various URLs, some of which are hosted on compromised WordPress sites, suggesting an attempt to redirect users to phishing pages or download additional malware. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly indicate malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9840

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://vds-construct.pl/userfiles/file/xubizikutafiliruteb.pdf
    • https://acryl-bg.com/userfiles/file/29331637474.pdf
    • http://www.canadiantreasurer.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607f24985b9d7---neporotowifavafijej.pdf
    • http://ukrainski-rosyjski.pl/userfiles/file/32802591306.pdf
    • http://fmafirm.com/customer/3/d/9/3d947ad6ce2568d98b832ccf5548371bFile/98381015692.pdf
    • https://engineeredrepinc.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/dd6da6de0846abad4eabd6276a26f095/kosusamavujirogunimilid.pdf
    • http://nd-58.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/a33f45d98d772abae3ebd148d6103d55/nupefunimebifolo.pdf
    • https://mziagroup.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/epkbveaugo51gunloc7dhsurn1/gijuwavegejabafebiwubi.pdf
    • http://frutapac.es/ckfinder/userfiles/files/93578362085.pdf
    • http://logisticsnetworks.net/ckfinder/userfiles/files/jumuvuwemokiwatorafeve.pdf
    • https://leuphuotcamap.com/uploads/image/files/17197190134.pdf
    • http://www.moyekolodin.com/files/36390679805.pdf
    • http://structurecreative.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c21870ccbdf---kefifuguki.pdf
    • http://totaldeliverancecathedralchurch.com/clients/2/22/22dae496a1749ae881e6bee195142b05/File/lixiwerowurujoxurotanivi.pdf
    • http://debseven.net/UserFiles/File/62697865338.pdf
    • http://ekbdrive.ru/ckfinder/userfiles/files/rijerupudoponujofu.pdf
    • https://www.perfumista.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/068969d3b6860c027095b2e69e065ed7/20903769228.pdf
    • http://codefon.hu/js/ckfinder/userfiles/files/12601351629.pdf
    • https://terravistahometeam.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/40f6cf37137ef479f1317276a126d491/zurovadeketopiwinofebex.pdf
    • https://hssipm.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/2b45ab7e9ed3b9a79317d0e1e1adad9d/70474286367.pdf
    • http://walker-doss.com/clients/4/45/450b4a4af5ff3f13851793278d9c7ef8/File/xigagupajopadeji.pdf
    • http://www.optionassurance.ca/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608d8d5d51b85---jefesomalupefixafobojato.pdf
    • https://mudateconmigo.cl/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/86680102a90c806c783ae1ad8629962f/34354570696.pdf
    • http://www.playerclub.ro/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a97fc638b1d---94099679494.pdf
    • http://wadirumshootingstars.com/userfiles/file///45262290754.pdf
    • https://www.adelaarenergy.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/pqrlt82u3tgnhk1muj050bmblq/42746511610.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/3CAf4wW3hvY/uplcv?utm_term=total+production+cost+example
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000c3f3.bin
740f4d5f74cb30197ceed5729dc7441c35f6d6ddba168ae8b5a6c830114cd191
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC3F3 16124 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000ed4f.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xED4F 16792 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00010566.bin
512a35458e355fe42ba27ff89bfa1dbef85216a2282e9652c905c8c11c26c879
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10566 10840 bytes