PDF malware analysis — malicious · 9fbf02a809a5cdee

MALICIOUS

PDF

13.1 KB

MD5: 44f543cbbc9ec3e0bfdd028cdc653988 SHA-1: b72c6fc0d3b8792b88eedb213a6edc33c35c6f4e SHA-256: 9fbf02a809a5cdeec4f33d445f8c232a4ca6b6f660ce7d542920e85719075cb1

84 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious Link: Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

The critical ClamAV heuristic 'Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36962' strongly indicates a known PDF exploit. The presence of embedded files and an AcroForm button with an action trigger further supports this, suggesting the PDF is designed to exploit a vulnerability. The embedded URL, while not directly malicious in reputation, is part of the exploit infrastructure. The exploit likely leads to the download and execution of a secondary payload.

Heuristics 5

ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36962 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36962
Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED

PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
XFA form low PDF_XFA

PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
AcroForm button with action trigger low PDF_ACROFORM_BUTTON

PDF contains a /Btn form field together with a SubmitForm/URI/Launch/JS trigger — this is the building block of fake 'Download' or 'Open' button overlays used in PDF phishing lures
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-locale-set/2.1/

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`embedded_file_obj0041.bin` `c06dcd026a7ea0536b63e07ce688691b585339a3ab7ff59065e546b56308c7bb`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 41 at offset 0x26E6	85 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0042.bin` `dda0835df994b8be920f715db36452f6cee7bb42bbc9c897f878a7b298ba8e91`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 42 at offset 0x2798	1029 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0043.bin` `9c58a0994eee827abd1bc8adae7b02a4c6236f9577fb5360a2838db447a23842`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 43 at offset 0x29B1	1789 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0044.bin` `3dd68f00f4fcb366a2a3a17c65cb2626eeddf5ea5713302d374310561d810169`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 44 at offset 0x2DC1	144 bytes
`embedded_file_obj0045.bin` `10c03f88a5f0a0833dc5b2c8ac295b3a3c6f65e23889eb8cc1dc6fe29bf7f275`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 45 at offset 0x2E6D	77 bytes

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