Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9fb656edc1c735ae…

MALICIOUS

PDF

85.6 KB Created: 2021-09-21 02:30:28 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-11-24
MD5: 2794bff28a92f42608dd69746dffca2c SHA-1: 997721c3e264ba4cbef02a40c6c17781106f4d40 SHA-256: 9fb656edc1c735aeb34c513e136a012aedbc815a5221d3913867598bff36917f
196 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains numerous embedded URLs, many of which point to compromised CMS uploads or disposable hosting, indicating a link farm designed to redirect users. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent, likely phishing or malware distribution. Although no scripts were directly extracted, the presence of 'cmd.com' in the document text suggests potential command execution, possibly via embedded JavaScript or other PDF exploits.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9974

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://catamma.ru/uplcv?utm_term=alerts+on+android+phone PDF link annotation
    • https://roshnaai.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/38743472961.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.osteopathe-montpellier-sud.fr/ckfinder/userfiles/files/relewamikujuvo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tolaniprojects.com/userfiles/file/95129753670.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://brothersaluminium.com.np/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613cda391b990---gudisezoxoliwuxogizagilen.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://npcbalkan.net/ckeditor/ckfinder/userfiles/files/mokekamekodimiwawesikijo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://webcertain.asia/contentupload/fckeditorUploads/organization_/file/sewujisosemunenesoxo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://klingende-zeder.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16134a583b817e---39224257413.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://thegioioto.store/upload/files/50365638047.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://drentmedischadvies.nl/uploads/files/52766130366.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://2b3la571ga-70p.com/contents/files/rabavefaw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://annamsaigonlaw.com/upload/files/49653327226.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://netcsemege.hu/ckfinder/userfiles/files/fuxisi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.viksexteriors.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1614069d172e28---79247735889.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pabxlg.com/userfiles/file/40343133275.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://webrobogo.hu/kepek/71643667517.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://studiotecnicolari.it/userfiles/files/19532004345.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://appli-veolia.net/ckfinder/userfiles/files/natenebodezofi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://toonesk.com/upload/40016503295.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vrzion.com/data/userfiles/files/reritape.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://qdcmd.com/data/files/sumomejededogenu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tatvideo.ru/ckfinder/userfiles/files/37800118759.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.supremecaravans.com.au/application/third_party/ckfinder/userfiles/files/kigivomibebopo.pdfIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • http://muaah.ca/userfiles/files/buzobevari.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://luatsubienhoa.com/upload/ck/files/48090067288.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://aynispirit.nl/userfiles/file/69887587142.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tatvideo.ru/cIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ea73.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEA73 17620 bytes
SHA-256: a69de5e7cf99e9c8552c0c61ab12d641e4a8e21a80eb89bc919b018fc55e169d
font_01_sfnt_off0001188b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1188B 10468 bytes
SHA-256: a35b0f4a09d586125de3fccdcdad7b47e0cebdebfeca04097fc506308a8ceaa7
font_02_sfnt_off00013042.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x13042 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

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