Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9fafb36829ae320d…

MALICIOUS

RTF

59.8 KB First seen: 2023-10-11
MD5: caf9223f60b5d0f402fd4b50b822c5f0 SHA-1: 89c564c11d25ae1e55f74d228c56bd80890fdf33 SHA-256: 9fafb36829ae320d92e38bc56a1833a96a7529416b12bd2ee0cdad178ddf36d3
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object, specifically identified as an Equation Editor exploit. The document body provides a lure related to financial audits, instructing the user to 'Enable editing'. This combination strongly suggests an attempt to exploit a vulnerability via the embedded object once the user is tricked into activating it.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00002a2f.bin
4c3220ed8a516b3c26495ed86296e42997a6d476133a1f2c0e831e120c3389d3
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2A2F 1522 bytes