Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9f9ad3bf2202f346…

MALICIOUS

PDF

73.0 KB Created: 2021-06-21 00:34:20 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 254194f671d7f4021ec23141aad9bcb0 SHA-1: e5b0e4999c629ec01f2b2e365ddb1e26e75eba8e SHA-256: 9f9ad3bf2202f346008767bfdf7d0227d72ca8e45804904fbd4ae091c292f4fc
164 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains numerous links pointing to compromised WordPress sites, suggesting a link farm designed to host malicious files. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely phishing or malware distribution. The presence of a 'download button' heuristic further supports the lure-based attack pattern.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://irlanc.ru/uplcv?utm_term=how+to+transfer+files+through+wifi+direct
    • https://duext.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/1b214140de37ea0d9710c39c81bf0a88/82654592695.pdf
    • https://alice-immo.com/userfiles/file/69631410474.pdf
    • http://cz-synergy.cz/data/file/96515225794.pdf
    • https://ddriu.hu/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/56d04d27ed7b061656860b447fc2d2f1/lekotefebovowefuwe.pdf
    • http://www.inhd.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608130da4ce19---raralunigopuraropixezeg.pdf
    • http://informerfitness.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/08fd677d235d9ec4a18404b86ed9d0fe/42767947136.pdf
    • http://aiswaryamatrimonials.com/fck_uploads/file/85111304642.pdf
    • http://sicilalluminio.it/userfiles/files/favivam.pdf
    • https://cor.org.ar/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/0gqqakqea2cfo98nie14l5p9eb/13378835289.pdf
    • https://dacoma.ro/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160748585b099a---putiserunijelukatetanawes.pdf
    • https://blackknowledge.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/101808e66138ee5d58ce27843692d595/81306508829.pdf
    • http://www.stratcareerservices.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ab8c78bb1e9---66580895639.pdf
    • http://blog.crowdly.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160799ee8090b7---vajurivenu.pdf
    • http://www.patricktennis.nl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160818080e23c4---poruje.pdf
    • http://jadever.vn/Images_upload/files/juwasenasususimanivi.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000df4e.bin
1d454ea874cb6471f167c99a131139c46b8322c360e1c519e024b3770b420830		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDF4E 5336 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000f17d.bin
7bac9789817cb2d0611c13c4c1545d2e846978f2499f48d709ccaec1ba8ff0a8		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF17D 11184 bytes

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