Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9f8f1d89dc9b8ae7…

MALICIOUS

PDF

41.2 KB Created: 2020-10-15 09:39:41 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-15
MD5: e120bda99164f36f63df588adc815023 SHA-1: 5f41ff7c21438ea79281cb1e452a83ca99a874ff SHA-256: 9f8f1d89dc9b8ae7fcbdc56d6c7c7f78af95c41c27f63f28d6b739df564e5c55
124 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 4

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/123?keyword=effectiveness+of+online+advertising+questionnaire+pdf In PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4367952/normal_5f876f227cfd4.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kasukironumasex.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131454791/574404.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tunimesepet.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131455680/7497551.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://viweposedijul.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070314/4270367.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gonerogad.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438616/jikadafaveda.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jakedekokobara.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131381480/fibaxizimudez.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zuxuzesis.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438019/vabalelogojuga.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037011.mozfiles.com/files/1037011/23174778921.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037145.mozfiles.com/files/1037145/23333661848.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1042983.mozfiles.com/files/1042983/levogivuvumedura.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1041404.mozfiles.com/files/1041404/56529024399.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/10455a9b-7aab-4229-a947-869110407775/fugisefunurixewiza.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/c00b5311-38b4-452e-83fd-8ec303bac4e6/fegabumujadogod.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/e968e6fc-ca22-4e7d-9ee0-f3f3658c340d/dokekilalabepobofiw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/6227291c-691f-474a-bf70-7f89fb761f23/89231884150.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/4468c0b3-307f-4a1e-a09c-2b48c119f851/75686066750.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0493/1108/8799/files/kekuned.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/4062/8120/files/queen_of_blades_tarot.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000054ea.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x54EA 5348 bytes
SHA-256: 7a202a4f352151028952e3e557903ca9f87eaa1cf7586ebdc613709acbf9081d
font_01_sfnt_off00006728.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6728 10000 bytes
SHA-256: 464fa1e888826b5144ebd92d58a539bd9dda024a21ed05c246dc749c7bb29bda
font_02_sfnt_off00008917.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8917 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 1062cd8ddf90f4344fa193b395386d5669df1a952e5759311ca261a71931f361

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