Malicious Office (OLE) / .PPT — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9f7fa165bfaea439…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .PPT

683.5 KB Created: 1601-01-01 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft PowerPoint
MD5: 78373aaf62fc7f5ac369b50455e67d44 SHA-1: 2d93c1ab4e4c409e617fecab098df9820b26316f SHA-256: 9f7fa165bfaea4391f7618932087af9a1cf5872b18d7c13eff8951be2e67293c
506 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1055.012 Process Hollowing T1055.001 Process Injection

The sample is a PowerPoint file that exploits CVE-2006-3877 to embed and deliver a PE executable. Heuristics indicate the use of process injection and remote thread creation, suggesting the embedded executable is designed to execute malicious code. No VBA macros were extractable, but the presence of an embedded executable is a strong indicator of malicious intent.

Heuristics 14

  • CVE-2006-3877 — PowerPoint malformed record payload critical CVE likely CVE_2006_3877
    PowerPoint OLE file declares a malformed large numbered Table stream that cannot be read through the CFB chain, while the carved stream bytes contain a PE-like payload. This is the static shape of the PowerPoint malformed-record exploit family fixed as CVE-2006-3877.
  • Reference to WriteProcessMemory API critical SC_STR_WRITEPROCESSMEMORY
    Reference to WriteProcessMemory API
  • Reference to CreateRemoteThread API critical SC_STR_CREATEREMOTETHREAD
    Reference to CreateRemoteThread API
  • Embedded PE executable critical OLE_EMBEDDED_EXE
    MZ/PE header found inside document — possible embedded executable
  • ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Agent-62058 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Trojan.Agent-62058
  • Reference to WinExec API high SC_STR_WINEXEC
    Reference to WinExec API
  • Reference to CreateProcess API high SC_STR_CREATEPROCESS
    Reference to CreateProcess API
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC
    Reference to VirtualAlloc API
  • Reference to VirtualProtect API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALPROTECT
    Reference to VirtualProtect API
  • Unsupported Office format for VBA extraction info OFFICE_FORMAT_UNSUPPORTED
    olevba could not extract VBA macros (PermissionError); format-agnostic byte-level scans still ran. Likely legacy, encrypted, or malformed OLE/OOXML — re-scanning the same bytes will yield the same outcome.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/iX/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_office_00003e78.exe
3adc6ce0e3943d7f711367d44b2d13e0c7f15e3e390f14bd1ce4fd46aa779ae6		 embedded-pe Office MZ+PE at offset 0x3E78 683912 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.87, consistent with packed or encrypted content.

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