Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9f74fd6a3372c18d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

2.35 MB
MD5: a207e737ec48efee2a2acc96b4163bd2 SHA-1: 0f6ad4486ca3d9e7c8fe69c166c073d5632ed114 SHA-256: 9f74fd6a3372c18da536cbc3c970831d68703cb5b2c70e39d2814ab0ab32e131
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an encrypted Office XLSX file that contains an embedded Equation Editor OLE object. Heuristics indicate that this object is anomalous and likely carries a payload, specifically targeting CVE-2018-0798. The encryption with a default password further suggests malicious intent, as it's a common technique to evade static analysis. No document body or scripts were extractable due to encryption, but the presence of the exploit carrier is sufficient evidence.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • CVE-2018-0798 — anomalous Equation Editor native stream high CVE likely CVE_2018_0798_EQUATION_NATIVE_ANOMALY
    Default-encrypted OOXML contains embedded Equation Editor data with anomalous native stream bytes consistent with a CVE-2018-0798-style exploit. This is treated as likely CVE evidence because the Equation object is malformed and payload-like.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Equation Editor object carries payload-like Ole10Native stream high OLE_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE_PAYLOAD_ANOMALY
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object declares the Equation Editor CLSID but stores a large high-entropy Ole10Native stream with malformed package sizing. This is exploit-shaped Equation/OLE payload evidence.
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.