Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9f6bbc7895b11524…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.7 KB
MD5: a1e94a6c4e965deba0558da2c457d493 SHA-1: 7a4737608ef39d116c6482a4b03d535901837eaa SHA-256: 9f6bbc7895b115241ce8867f69d2df4b5de57f779f99eae6fa7e21b0c36ffb91
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.002 Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering a critical heuristic for Equation Editor exploitation. The \objupdate directive indicates that the embedded object will be activated upon opening, leading to the execution of arbitrary code via a known vulnerability. No further stages or IOCs were identified in the static analysis.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000ac.bin
5a47157ec63ccba69672a0ae2ea74369fc0519add6155bddb5b6ea826d070163
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xAC 1648 bytes