RTF malware analysis — malicious · 9f56bf6f67697b5f

MALICIOUS

RTF

87.6 KB First seen: 2024-08-21

MD5: 9ecf1863c58b62b5478a1abd912e5b72 SHA-1: 398721250ba71f217b70508051edfea2a7d4380d SHA-256: 9f56bf6f67697b5feea58e889dd326238c5c98e89e86a6e16e7b532b9abaddad

120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object that leverages the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of `RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR` and `RTF_OBJUPDATE` heuristics indicates exploitation of a known vulnerability to achieve code execution. This is a common delivery mechanism for malware, likely intended to download and execute a further stage.

Heuristics 3

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00001e5a.bin` `98af8ae146778c63a663aefcaf606d4181aabcdf8d5dfa781f94f78f6feb3705`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1E5A	1710 bytes

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