Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9f4adc079d4133b1…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.4 KB
MD5: 7c1ddc3508debd8d9f72130ea04aae57 SHA-1: 8bd37f8e47669ab02c6b9c1a0aa68d13c3971695 SHA-256: 9f4adc079d4133b1f81b3e16a3a806cb482dbb530db628c91de14beb02216e2d
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering the CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability through a crafted Equation Editor object. This exploit is designed to execute arbitrary code upon opening the document, likely leading to the download and execution of a secondary payload. The presence of the 'equAtIon.3' ProgID strongly indicates the use of this known Microsoft Office Equation Editor vulnerability.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000db.bin
acfbd983417dd7d916e0d787455f813b2c1435f3818dbfbee5c6f28f38948702		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xDB 1951 bytes

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