Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9f435b7216882c26…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

274.9 KB Created: 2021-07-30 20:33:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2022-08-09
MD5: 88934aa25d6533faca5c5497e7f5d738 SHA-1: bd03565dc09db3bccabe6003088f9337a2519426 SHA-256: 9f435b7216882c2609b039105c551db32278032eb5f707ac527c331e73832ed2
202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains a VBA macro with a Document_Open auto-execution function, which is a common technique for malware delivery. The macro uses CreateObject to execute code, and the presence of a remote image beacon and external relationship points to a URL that is likely used to download a secondary payload. The document body explicitly instructs the user to 'Enable editing' and 'Enable content', further supporting the lure technique.

Heuristics 8

  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Remote image (web beacon / tracking pixel) medium OOXML_IMAGE_BEACON
    Document references an external image URL — loads automatically on open, revealing IP address and timestamp to the server (used for phishing tracking and NTLM hash theft on corporate networks)
  • External relationship medium OOXML_EXTERNAL_REL
    External target in word/_rels/document.xml.rels: http://milojeriks.com/xs/RwQxSm53BND6tgX5tb6RliXx_SYLxxZnyg~~/Vi48ZoqbuqgIU9PYaRtireboS9JM-YdeWg~~/
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://milojeriks.com/xs/RwQxSm53BND6tgX5tb6RliXx_SYLxxZnyg~~/Vi48ZoqbuqgIU9PYaRtireboS9JM-YdeWg~~/
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
a4260f9ffca19cd9507bf726f5cce7c1fb677518656a11a702b8a544799a0cde		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 9191 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
7bc444fd354d97baf83a218dca0f176499a1e998c57be913b3e7f0abc587d6d3		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 33792 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.