Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9f424423b784ceb7…

MALICIOUS

RTF

229.0 KB First seen: 2026-06-26
MD5: 415c8b2deb5930845b987a098b0730cd SHA-1: ce51acdabbce1240bb38d67e3719fbe0ef9ea59e SHA-256: 9f424423b784ceb74299fa4bd2449775398a776a4ff302fa5ec90a9a154be251
100 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF file contains OLE object data and an \objupdate directive, indicating an attempt to execute embedded content upon opening. The document body includes a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', a common tactic for macro-based malware. The embedded artifact 'objdata_00_off000083d6.bin' is flagged as a potential shellcode candidate, suggesting it's part of the malicious payload execution chain.

Heuristics 4

  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000083d6.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x83D6 1822 bytes
SHA-256: 6c6eb27b6b7c671a7640450cdf467866fc431c41748a31010b00109d0936811c
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_GETPC_CALL