Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9f28f8a52225f8e1…

MALICIOUS

RTF

1.21 MB First seen: 2018-07-27
MD5: 23b144a3a1b57dd1d3b52773db38f846 SHA-1: 12aa3f278ac9148bb2a6b053b2c0254e4fd484be SHA-256: 9f28f8a52225f8e17173e7522a1662a361aa8c3710ac67315af0c4ef6b9ec7a1
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF file contains a large amount of hex-encoded data within an OLE object, and a heuristic indicates that \objupdate forces OLE activation. This strongly suggests the file is designed to embed and execute a malicious payload when the OLE object is activated. The document body mimics a SWIFT financial message, indicating a spearphishing attempt to trick the user into interacting with the malicious object.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native stream in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_OLE10NATIVE_STREAM
    RTF contains an embedded OLE object with an Ole10Native stream. This is a strong payload-container signal and is related to Word/OLE exploit delivery, but it is not specific enough on its own to assign a CVE.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX
    RTF contains ~1226KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000003e9.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3E9 24382 bytes
SHA-256: 742956b6135faf5552999a844dcd359d927175e9608a54c1937d9ed072ee8b1e