Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9f22d890ee492f51…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

24.3 KB First seen: 2022-11-10
MD5: 52f20f8d97f816e089f5464c63874690 SHA-1: 45c384e7cf55042bf4ac62e5ad2c5019c5e784d3 SHA-256: 9f22d890ee492f51e4399cdeef81b98bb571394c1331b4bf5db2117681d541e4
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID and uses an \objupdate directive to force activation, indicating an exploit attempt. The document body includes a lure instructing the user to "Enable editing" to view its content, which is a common tactic for macro-based malware droppers.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00004a7a.bin
93768504106cfc3af277d176747b775bf11df2e604a7a67fb7f74582b6a14586
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4A7A 1649 bytes