Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9f00a5fc9bdc5206…

MALICIOUS

RTF

101.6 KB First seen: 2024-09-25
MD5: 7a9a05109dd848058fd327bc38459a3d SHA-1: a086488bd204ca42e9d522b769b94c9467ad5520 SHA-256: 9f00a5fc9bdc5206d34d60f39e9872df590b4b71685afb0996e2d46e2b5a97d2
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document that leverages the Equation Editor vulnerability, indicated by the RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics. This exploit is designed to trigger the execution of embedded OLE object data, which is a common method for delivering secondary payloads. The presence of OLE object data further supports the conclusion that this is a delivery mechanism for further malicious activity.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000014f5.bin
77afe5d3d5f8a7dfd8edba2bdc2bdfeb0f68fbedd678ce1840005073afc405ac
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x14F5 2030 bytes