Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9ee0e41ed56d818e…

MALICIOUS

RTF

15.6 KB
MD5: b5d0eb95a5cc13b81481a3d1caf7b682 SHA-1: c97da74e5b73bf00a8d50cf2b93c6eb40566a791 SHA-256: 9ee0e41ed56d818e000459fc1d044f811b091d8b7d2963129968d66c56828dc3
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The RTF document contains OLE object data and specifically triggers an Equation Editor exploit. The \objupdate directive forces OLE activation, indicating an attempt to execute embedded code. While no specific script was extracted, the heuristics strongly suggest exploitation of the Equation Editor vulnerability to achieve code execution, likely as a downloader or initial access vector.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001706.bin
f8d35266bbc39d3a571e6dfe5f9142fa1c3f37720f03b609f72790fe3adb9ae4
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1706 1225 bytes