Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9ecdcf05758efd93…

MALICIOUS

PDF

66.9 KB Created: 2020-11-25 02:50:23 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-27
MD5: c28413b187b312375a9a7868eba590b8 SHA-1: 788b2dbc5c96a47fa863df8e7687a32e636733a5 SHA-256: 9ecdcf05758efd9327cabae5be46b4c5198cfe84a532ae01fa0ecdbd9ba24e42
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file contains a large number of external links, many pointing to disposable hosting services, indicating a link farm or phishing operation. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent, likely related to phishing or malware distribution. Although no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and numerous external URLs are indicative of an attempt to redirect users to malicious sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://trafficel.ru/aws?utm_term=canon+eos+utility++canada PDF link annotation
    • https://kokexofagisukop.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132710589/vufatoxozowinev.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jakedekokobara.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131381480/8536469.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zatetemaf.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134494585/sidifevowifabofe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sopinukinofov.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134767260/6465001.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://munulibur.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134508804/rikojidedabu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lodirunesu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874391/gexenop.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kadogejajufa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134717900/4afdce44ef5d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://beripetalodewug.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134865824/fivuxox.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dasezakam.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134883145/868ee5a05c96.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vonubaxuted.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131452839/voninajekagefumazis.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wivixovipi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134442696/5226380.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://totapige.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131483287/c6d034.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://guzugalaxob.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134767263/votolip.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nipufijupetobug.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131482996/jazatozesaja.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000cc53.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCC53 4844 bytes
SHA-256: af1e5c29ff502e5e09b221453ecf5439ef8e737c9b5686875c1dc9810ac62d31
font_01_sfnt_off0000dce5.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDCE5 9892 bytes
SHA-256: a7c1b536a2bd3d48212d485a2fe823cd7726ec24f0af1c29b25519615c421cce

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