RTF malware analysis — malicious · 9eb87a2416b79b10

MALICIOUS

RTF

4.1 KB

MD5: d51db0f037f97835cb334b38b4ce772f SHA-1: ebdd88a747493385c96da530271e214df874f0ab SHA-256: 9eb87a2416b79b100ca24fa57d1bfa15fcce90a44f5cbb10353ed7e873394753

120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. The ".objupdate" directive forces the activation of these embedded objects, leading to the exploitation of the Equation Editor to execute arbitrary code. This is a common technique for delivering malicious payloads via spearphishing attachments.

Heuristics 3

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off000000e6.bin` `eef06d6a3998dba4bfa0af7e3f3456486ef9f62b47344f2af478b4bd9cd906fb`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xE6	1837 bytes

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