Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9e94c305f6d7a7af…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOCX

986.0 KB Created: 2021-06-24 12:03:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: fbf9faada38a52880c6a1e9113c50ea6 SHA-1: 413900b646a03929a116ee53c5857508a9cdbbc7 SHA-256: 9e94c305f6d7a7af5ba3555ef5c3e9d98d66fe5c9b639f41c8fc044e65091ae9
682 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic for Applications T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

The sample is a malicious Word document containing a VBA macro that attempts to drop a file named 'kikus.dll' and execute it using the ShellExecuteA API. The presence of an embedded PE executable and shellcode-like heuristics (PEB access, VirtualProtect, GetProcAddress) suggests a multi-stage payload delivery mechanism. The ClamAV detection 'Win.Packed.Johnnie' indicates the embedded artifact is packed, and the 'kikus.dll' execution pattern is consistent with a generic macro-based downloader/dropper.

Heuristics 18

  • Office EPRINT stream contains EMF object high CVE related OLE_EPRINT_EMF_OBJECT
    OLE ObjectPool contains an EPRINT stream with EMF data. This is rare in normal documents and is CVE-2007-3893/MS07-046-family evidence when paired with Office exploit payload anomalies, but the malformed EMF record is not proven by this rule alone.
  • OLE with Ole10Native — possible CVE-2026-21514 exploitation high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514
    Document contains a Word OLE object with Ole10Native plus executable, PE, or risky remote-link indicators. CVE-2026-21514 exploits OLE metadata validation; this stronger structure is treated as likely exploitation.
  • Embedded PE executable critical OLE_EMBEDDED_EXE
    MZ/PE header found inside document — possible embedded executable
  • ClamAV: Win.Packed.Johnnie-10034316-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Packed.Johnnie-10034316-0
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • PEB access via FS segment (x86) high SC_PEB_ACCESS
    PEB access via FS segment (x86)
  • Reference to ShellExecute API high SC_STR_SHELLEXEC
    Reference to ShellExecute API
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • Ole10Native package carries executable/script file type high OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in an executable or script-capable extension. Even without UI extension spoofing, embedding a runnable payload inside an Office document is a high-risk delivery pattern.
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Reference to VirtualProtect API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALPROTECT
    Reference to VirtualProtect API
  • Excel 4.0 (XLM) macro sheet present medium OLE_XLM_AUTOOPEN
    Workbook contains an Excel 4.0 macro sheet sub-stream — XLM is rarely seen in modern legitimate workbooks and was a major Office malware vector during 2020-2022.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
ad427da8430d0bab4b976c0aa215ff17485db4f0e31aee29dd87b9d86837c45d
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 2742 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
embedded_office_0008ee71.exe
65e021fb000ae5bb8ae8de779ed224e30536a1923ad1b225e781ec7a0150be0d
embedded-pe Office MZ+PE at offset 0x8EE71 424335 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Packed.Midie-10008727-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
ole10native_00.bin
4c91f75e7c646f02a4e81780f886c821e4e2f07e1e8a72c19ca473cdc5e34b4c
ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: ObjectPool/_1686016338/Ole10Native 384309 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Packed.Johnnie-10034316-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely