Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9e942829bc531c42…

MALICIOUS

RTF

4.1 KB First seen: 2019-02-20
MD5: 5647edf59d684d0d5be1353b9e7efadf SHA-1: 87de76f566523347e467e7b1af0e7ddb3e7ebbcf SHA-256: 9e942829bc531c42f6681cceb36b3e3e90532a92e9af82e4a92be7a9b6b2a055
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains heuristics indicating the exploitation of the Equation Editor (RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR, RTF_OBJDATA) and forces OLE activation (RTF_OBJUPDATE). This suggests the file is designed to exploit a vulnerability in the Equation Editor component to achieve code execution, likely to download and run a secondary payload. The presence of 'EQNEDT32.EXE' in the embedded data further supports this attack vector.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000003c.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3C 2080 bytes
SHA-256: 60a83779402ab6605176b5d3e3f99fe54fe1867bf38031cd3fb24ae5707a421e

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