Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9e8a892316c7b59f…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

227.7 KB
MD5: 39941900fcc8c021bff5d26385901cc9 SHA-1: f91524a4ccb26559eaafd953c8dcca75869b5905 SHA-256: 9e8a892316c7b59ff0241a5f892ee9040e3043c70336e2af6063b32fa150aad4
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains multiple OLE objects, including an automatically linked object that forces activation via \objupdate. This strongly suggests a lure to trick the user into enabling content, a common tactic for malware droppers. The presence of embedded OLE objects and the SE_ENABLE_LURE heuristic further support this attack pattern. No specific family could be identified from the available evidence.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000965.bin
c1bc1432a2b989abd886f6139f0c4482fbb5a9eea79c2fe940a07dca07f21bb1
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x965 19832 bytes
objdata_01_off0000ab28.bin
18cff8ef194415d33763880bf64011d23305e4b9143b76244b89e1c53b70a0d5
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xAB28 2632 bytes
objdata_02_off0000c0cb.bin
44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xC0CB 12297 bytes