Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9e895716b8446be3…

MALICIOUS

PDF

76.2 KB Created: 2021-09-19 02:13:12 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-26
MD5: 232b5fd32ee5208f942e5f5eb714cd6e SHA-1: 7a219667811a5f7d89d637c1800a3294985c9390 SHA-256: 9e895716b8446be3a425dcc63272f64ac67e857054a925eb38a0767c3969317a
176 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains numerous embedded URLs, many of which point to potentially compromised CMS upload directories or disposable hosting, suggesting a link farm designed to obscure the final destination. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly indicate malicious intent, likely related to phishing or malware delivery. While no scripts were extracted, the structure and embedded links are indicative of a multi-stage attack.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9840

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Clickable URI points to raw IP address medium PDF_URI_IP_LITERAL
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) action whose host is a literal IPv4 address. Legitimate documents normally link to named domains; raw-IP destinations are common in disposable phishing and malware-delivery infrastructure.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://mgs-on-track.com/app/webroot/userfiles/file/mefeguvugusexumapixite.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://henanshuangxin.com/d/files/41146948681.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://seedomoretravel.com/files/files/gawedusifemukavuvuv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://seksdagen.nl/userfiles/file/suledivanovaduzemetepe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://anbc31.iscriptscloud.com/app/webroot/files/file/52625309815.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://thehouseproduction.net/file/kuxorebe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kanat.com/upload/ckfinder/files/xodimug.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://rovitek.com/userfiles/file/xozonofepizaxatamono.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://maisonforville.be/documents/file/70187710891.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://telekommarketing.com/firme_data/files/99549758373.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://211.129.1.225/system/ckfinder/userfiles/files/puwijetaloj.pdfPDF link annotation
    • https://www.c2commercial.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/fdbabae48e6b270b5952daf35fe536f2/51958730483.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://christ-china.com/filespath/files/20210906092545.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cungcapthitdetuoi.com/app/webroot/files/images/pages/files/pigunukoxazuwanofofid.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://freeski.hu/freeski/file/69120583126.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://limblength-sldf.com/userfiles/file/18340409294.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://stepweystudy.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/famexapuzadaremawobunuku.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pragatitic.org/ckfinder/userfiles/files/64987449145.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.davidcosz.de/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/06clmroden175hfit04pj2te0c/sogitawejexu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vansuloi.com/uploads/userfiles/file/jevezufaxuka.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sammycar.ch/sammy/sites/default/sammyfiles/newsletterfile/55041910435.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://az4group.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613fdb655e1b5---fixisinabaravoto.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://antonellascarpittadesigner.it/userfiles/files/dojezew.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://eqonetech.com/upload/userfiles/files/37469431651.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kondicionery-noginsk.ru/upload_picture/file/mizigolajagifeluta.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://shacklefordlawoffice.com/customer/3/d/9/3d947ad6ce2568d98b832ccf5548371bFile/gefasizorofodegevagejinip.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/3CAf4wW3hvY/uplcv?utm_term=android+industries+lansing+miPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000c3d0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC3D0 17732 bytes
SHA-256: 225f3dcd4b61af8e07f12911973596167972d64399f5adec7011ad5de681a19c
font_01_sfnt_off0000f276.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF276 10672 bytes
SHA-256: 2b9b66b17e624bac95307e2aeffe6527cda6953412ea1e1e096f2ed58c398065
font_02_sfnt_off00010ab9.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10AB9 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

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