Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9e6c179b789971cf…

MALICIOUS

PDF

60.7 KB Created: 2020-10-07 01:13:11 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-19
MD5: d606f3646f6bcab68fccbef8fda83085 SHA-1: 574cbbe41f0d4bf2ffb6a4d42482b5c964f69f26 SHA-256: 9e6c179b789971cf178699ace4677c3f23a0274592c234596551c18977b5f763
204 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Callback phishing phone lure medium SE_CALLBACK_LURE
    Document asks the user to call a phone number in billing, refund, subscription, fraud, or security context — consistent with callback phishing or tech-support scam patterns. Suppressed for legitimate-issuer (IRS/gov/official-form) or Microsoft license-boilerplate documents that carry no urgency or charge/dispute escalation.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/pify?keyword=hawaii+driver%2527s+license+renewal+appointment In PDF document text
    • http://files.professorofpractice.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874240/8970a8.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://folidiko.sheilastonephotographer.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131857650/gipak.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://fikagesiz.reportcard.mrslambsroom.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776791/1958281.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.mshawe.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453943/2053913816b4f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037035.mozfiles.com/files/1037035/tepozexitepesake.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1043939.mozfiles.com/files/1043939/12429814144.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037283.mozfiles.com/files/1037283/joremebiboburog.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1040563.mozfiles.com/files/1040563/33589019488.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/405ebc8a-744a-43b6-9ace-f3cb5b70decc/kumefugewesevalixozi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/cf7e4915-56b2-4dfa-957b-0f59c51f3086/zupijufolapikulaji.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/49982c4f-1294-40a1-89e4-d86de7eec86d/18887305195.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0483/3804/3031/files/25576071150.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/9778/3458/files/61880567349.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0457/3783/6710/files/98472093112.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000af92.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xAF92 5364 bytes
SHA-256: 8d1ef0c15b2a0b76d7d362d837394b9c5cbf9f1535cfd4afe4b5f7916a9382d5
font_01_sfnt_off0000c1df.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC1DF 10540 bytes
SHA-256: 8151c4556f1f5f7fd3f182ac49d239c0744c1e2a291dbc765b4e9b8e71b69948