Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9e24e8c4468fdc40…

MALICIOUS

PDF

83.1 KB Created: 2021-08-20 20:09:25 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-11
MD5: 76ec05ede1cd5ea9f87ad34d1e382792 SHA-1: 5503976ea4fb837b34629addd42d9f9d8220cabc SHA-256: 9e24e8c4468fdc40e2b87c4d759764b1bac232c50cc0a484689791da386ab869
156 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF document contains a link farm hosted on compromised CMS upload directories, suggesting an attempt to distribute malicious files. The heuristic 'SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE' indicates the document likely instructs the user to open a password-protected archive, a common tactic to evade gateway security. While no scripts were directly extracted, the presence of embedded URLs and the ML classifier's high confidence score point towards a malicious intent to deliver a second-stage payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9990

Heuristics 7

  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://www.masismarketing.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/aae8cc65091da57e2e940442a472b876/vugovumudawemikemim.pdf In PDF document text
    • https://dmddsgn.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5ec45d978696da58acdbdc385fe9ef7a/96984170591.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://immo-cjeanpaul.lu/userfiles/files/temojefujufilap.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://aromamarketing.md/img/files/5071886293.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://diversifiedhumansolutions.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/c6542d70d1dc061b340afa9aacaeb8bf/ramov.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://exactblue.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606fba4e37934---32547462801.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.medicalart.com.tr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16071cf0fb3189---xerifafunalawuzukekew.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://asu.com.vn/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/lo78oqg2f02lhrqe2ko410nhak/sewitigodenokawu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ebsjosepirosamaria.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16102fa0ab601f---rupujosav.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.beadvised.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/bcea555a0fac9a872ce3e352bc3750f0/15534729208.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mikepromedia.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/3451c8e165f900bdea7ec86f7ea4d30b/jazafije.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xpressup.com/userfiles/file/56662239744.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://mbcasc.net/imgs/file/somovukewip.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://targdenunti.ro/userfiles/file/kubobotolumuruxezesoma.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.inkfactory.pk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16083260465110---filonilinemore.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kemenyseprosiklos.hu/upload/file/ziwugawodejulozovefuk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://healthywithhart.com/res/file/kugolam.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.tai.gr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1610bfa4ab80ea---lagiwojutijojesep.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://baharemadinah.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160fd2ef793525---58346628232.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mobspace.xyz/web/img/podborky/files/kivuzepejudinu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mk-promotions.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/xurarinewef.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://radissonhoteltraining.com/userfiles/file/tavuzolored.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nanosoft.mn/images/content/File/65099184588.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://franklcalabreseattorney.com/customer/3/d/9/3d947ad6ce2568d98b832ccf5548371bFile/paguzupobimekow.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/YTWXjIUwRh0/uplcv?utm_term=smart+wizard+setup+netgear+downloadPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000de78.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDE78 11056 bytes
SHA-256: 1b661b2c4620cca7ade6b2d17eccaf29b1021a82b0aa24c41b10365446d6376e
font_01_sfnt_off0000f803.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF803 17672 bytes
SHA-256: c70f9ab0c15b33d5bef378b17fb46535f819250e78ccaab348c592c29e1d1b83
font_02_sfnt_off0001260b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1260B 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

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