Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9e090600684bdd89…

MALICIOUS

PDF

48.0 KB Created: 2020-08-03 14:23:04 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 78f02dca5e354b7289950c9cc645b98c SHA-1: 69c1612e7dfbabaf21abdc5766757a4f7d087861 SHA-256: 9e090600684bdd89646be0372de7c00ff19f85bf95e44050744a3e1016969056
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF file contains a link farm and a critical redirector link pointing to ttraff.ru, which is known malicious infrastructure. The document body, though heavily corrupted, contains the text 'Hong kong airport terminal 1 map pdf' and the malicious URL, suggesting a lure to trick users into clicking the link. The presence of numerous embedded PDF links further supports the redirection or phishing intent.

Heuristics 3

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/pify?keyword=hong+kong+airport+terminal+1+map+pdf
    • http://files.stumpysconcessions.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131871687/4b5b54c04672e22.pdf
    • http://files.5ivezero.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437538/boxuzuzege-jamov-susaxozokusonir.pdf
    • http://files.barbschaeffer.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874015/ee4f3cea839bd.pdf
    • http://files.amandaolsondpt.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776611/961f7d.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0438/9024/5787/files/91291564963.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0436/1384/7710/files/jogurifewi.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/4291/3952/files/juxojumewoxibafikepa.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/8353/0394/files/amazon_kdp_account.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/6331/1512/files/11879406240.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/4667/4337/files/juxafisowapatoro.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/8250/6647/files/xerox_sales_training_manual.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/3287/1074/files/34618881124.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0439/3834/9211/files/cuisinart_dfp_14bcn.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/2537/5130/files/levusamenosajuvaw.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/9476/1877/files/22402651611.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00007e50.bin
026c7a497dc094028bb9890848bac148143ec6f4f501cd382a4cdfa61aa3ba3b
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7E50 5260 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00009028.bin
0a39641b66ee05e9ccbc57f8c9decb00d3efca0c4099ab6475e0baf2acbe2db0
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9028 10084 bytes