Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9de13e33afef015b…

MALICIOUS

PDF

71.7 KB Created: 2021-06-06 20:49:34 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 97f2ca6c23add6755485e801d5fa4dad SHA-1: d9089d00286be814635c3ed200bb919772087248 SHA-256: 9de13e33afef015bda14790cf63c8eed457b39ecffd33b7235d59fee107197ff
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, indicating a link farm designed to direct users to malicious content. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly suggest malicious intent, likely phishing or malware distribution. Although no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and numerous external links are indicative of techniques used to redirect users to potentially harmful sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9991

Heuristics 6

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://archism.ru/pbw?utm_term=how+to+reset+drum+counter+brother+mfc+7360n
    • https://kinokisavejobet.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/7/5/137513499/3b11107e.pdf
    • https://mujurusema.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134846640/3410567.pdf
    • https://legufita.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134866723/tugoremimazuwexejo.pdf
    • https://jupaxegusuwe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135389123/rutufesemoto-woxanepux-silome-sinunefik.pdf
    • https://xepuduwosijun.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134634987/86d12ed49.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4405946/normal_603a49c68a92f.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4482018/normal_60417c94ece3a.pdf
    • https://funujitumim.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135347265/gatepag.pdf
    • https://zexonozanefamiw.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131163740/ketefirabajalav.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4459036/normal_6011c3a36d7dc.pdf
    • https://vifekifuveju.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134597055/9658675.pdf
    • https://satukaxel.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135346341/3939221.pdf
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4413017/normal_5fde6c2737745.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://sizolasipape.pbworks.com/f/26994856035.pdf
    • http://wefolevemud.pbworks.com/f/mini_practice_set_2_accounting_answers_bank_reconciliation_form.pdf
    • http://kokoxudalux.pbworks.com/f/how_to_get_unlimited_diamonds_sniper_3d.pdf
    • http://lufokomarib.pbworks.com/w/file/fetch/144458097/ark_survival_evolved_mod_menu_download.pdf
    • http://gogoporiwo.pbworks.com/w/file/fetch/144465735/7459436303.pdf
    • http://togusan.pbworks.com/f/xisigewup.pdf
    • http://kedetuwi.pbworks.com/f/mongodb_university_m001_final_exam_answers.pdf
    • http://zufogopojut.pbworks.com/f/43425870637.pdf
    • http://tarogifere.pbworks.com/w/file/fetch/144676836/84641739717.pdf
    • http://jinotofatum.pbworks.com/f/content_practice_a_lesson_3_dna_and_genetics_answer_key.pdf
    • http://nusuwoxub.pbworks.com/f/ielts_reading_placement_test_2021.pdf
    • http://mepijewaj.pbworks.com/w/file/fetch/144426846/9197448267.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d67d.bin
c6b599cb978a8cdd0b7637418e8fda450dbfd6e2048f6301233304a5f5392341
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD67D 5752 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000e9fc.bin
d971a47086122537ac0eb23d1341fc5bd06bdf0ea077db1b95b97c35fe254b9d
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE9FC 11208 bytes