Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9ddfdea64524acaa…

MALICIOUS

PDF

44.6 KB Created: 2020-11-04 08:58:17 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: bb3cf76345601d7d68bd9457df1a7ac3 SHA-1: b814d705c59cf44ab528d5cc9de3e247539881ff SHA-256: 9ddfdea64524acaab2794addb0e959a2d48f7915f242f34c4ed6b9f521922d4d
94 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a heuristic firing for a malicious redirector link pointing to 'https://cctraff.ru/aws?keyword=night+mode+app+download'. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the document body contains obfuscated text and the URL suggests a lure for a malicious download or phishing attempt, aligning with spearphishing attachment tactics.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 3

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/aws?keyword=night+mode+app+download
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4377407/normal_5f9998b419698.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4367013/normal_5f88369c1b15e.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4373997/normal_5f98884e36472.pdf
    • https://dosaremuxabibi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739916/nijivejutiribax_noxeru.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/lanorolowu/bhagat_singh_speech_in_english.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/sugaguxagu/cubs_schedule_2019.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zirojopemup/vuvexonivalinakeninusuvi.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/matogapibelifiv/evangeline_funeral_home_new_iberia.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/naranofinovujix/ruxajorarebaboxagi.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/ninazarila/kokobuwiduti.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/napoledunadigo/3679187683.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000061eb.bin
4c63d4faced3df9139aa9c3d539dcc3f8b929ca898a4410b86c04c2839c43281
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x61EB 4948 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000072b7.bin
5348833362f61aa54b9f30868df5eee8eaba232d393bac17d24823f49c25089a
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x72B7 10720 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0000977e.bin
1158d95dac44631f497756703988ba3645251422e7ff0015d3fca430225e7c3e
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x977E 4324 bytes