Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9dd051e5147bb2fb…

MALICIOUS

PDF

66.4 KB
MD5: a08871da4760ab2e78b2b4f5ebaddbc3 SHA-1: 921196fd9d72e7a8d93e137a5927aef81ae45c63 SHA-256: 9dd051e5147bb2fbc1bb2349fa2e9617e23341c39187905ef81b72e4a65a8b0c
136 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file contains embedded scripts and triggers a critical heuristic for the CVE-2010-0188 exploit, indicating it's designed to compromise systems running vulnerable versions of Adobe Reader. The embedded script payload suggests an attempt to download and execute further malicious content. The presence of embedded files and XFA forms are common delivery mechanisms for such exploits.

Heuristics 6

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
  • XFA form contains executable script high CVE related PDF_XFA_SCRIPT
    PDF embeds an XFA form whose dataset contains a <script> or <xfa:script> block — XFA scripting has been the exploit primitive for several Adobe Reader RCEs (CVE-2010-0188 family, CVE-2018-4901, and others). Plain XFA without scripts is far less risky.
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0008.bin
c79026af0c5e4b8231c3c081162180509b5a59349e7f1a001d83b108c0ba9a35
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0xC6 67284 bytes