Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9dbb0ac6f271748f…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

518.0 KB First seen: 2022-07-30
MD5: a4ac896920ffb2ce1c797f56bbad3874 SHA-1: 3004e013a57dbbb3eca4af532f6410489676ae01 SHA-256: 9dbb0ac6f271748f176562a0419a07dd6ab5154e48abf8e38859ded2a91e0eb1
80 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The document is encrypted with a default password, a common technique to hide malicious content. Heuristics indicate it's an exploit carrier containing an OLE object, suggesting it's designed to drop or execute a secondary payload. No document body or scripts were extractable due to encryption.

Heuristics 3

  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE
    OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007+, AES-128)).
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.

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