Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Heuristics 13

• PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
  PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
• Generic recovered JavaScript exploit stage high PDF_GENERIC_STAGE_RECOVERY
  Bounded static stage recovery exposed hidden JavaScript through generic transforms such as null-byte collapse, percent decoding, marker replacement, arithmetic character codes, fromCharCode, numeric arrays, numeric-array minus-key decoders, alphabet-index arrays, /Producer half-difference metadata arrays, hex literals, marker-stripped Base64 literals, custom 6-bit XOR table decoders, or repeated-marker hex carriers. This rule is emitted only when the recovered stage contains exploit-like Acrobat JavaScript or shellcode markers.
• Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
  PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
• JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
  PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
• Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
  PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
• Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
  PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
• XFA form low PDF_XFA
  PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
• Optional Content Group with action trigger low PDF_OPTIONAL_CONTENT
  Optional Content Group (layer) co-occurs with an action trigger — content can be selectively hidden from viewers or scanners while the action still fires on open
• AcroForm button with action trigger low PDF_ACROFORM_BUTTON
  PDF contains a /Btn form field together with a SubmitForm/URI/Launch/JS trigger — this is the building block of fake 'Download' or 'Open' button overlays used in PDF phishing lures
• External URI info PDF_URI
  PDF contains an external URL action
• Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
  The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
• Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
  One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
• Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
  One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
  URL http://www.appliedsec.com/files/The_Evolving_Art_of_Fuzzing.pdf

  • http://www.appliedsec.com/resources.html
  • http://www.vdalabs.com/home
  • http://www.vdalabs.com/services
  • http://www.vdalabs.com/about_us
  • http://www.vdalabs.com/contact_us
  • http://www.vdalabs.com/
  • http://www.vdalabs.com
  • http://www.appliedsec.com/files/The_Evolving_Art_of_Fuzzing.pdf)/S/URI
  • http://www.appliedsec.com/resources.html)/S/URI
  • http://www.vdalabs.com/home)/S/URI
  • http://www.vdalabs.com/services)/S/URI
  • http://www.vdalabs.com/about_us)/S/URI
  • http://www.vdalabs.com/contact_us)/S/URI
  • http://www.vdalabs.com)/S
  • http://www.monotype.comMonotype
  • http://media.defcon.org/dc-14/video/Defcon14-V42-Jared_DeMott-Evolving_art_of_Fuzzing.mp4
  • http://us.i1.yimg.com/us.yimg.com/lib/smb/assets/hosting/yss/themes/tangiers/v_1_24/images/bg_loop.gif
  • http://us.i1.yimg.com/us.yimg.com/lib/smb/assets/hosting/yss/themes/tangiers/v_1_24/images/hd_bg1.jpg
  • http://us.i1.yimg.com/us.yimg.com/lib/smb/assets/hosting/yss/themes/tangiers/v_1_24/images/nav_bg.gif
  • http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml
  • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/
  • http://media.defcon.org/dc-14/video/Defcon14-V42-Jared_DeMott-Evolving_art_of_Fuzzing.mp4)/S/URI
  • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
  • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
  • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
  • http://cgi.adobe.com/special/acrobat/update
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
  • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-form/2.5/
  • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xci/1.0/
  • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/
  • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-locale-set/2.1/
  • https://www.verisign.com/rpa
  • http://ocsp.verisign.com/ocsp/status0
  • https://www.verisign.com/rpa0
  • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/CodeSignPCA.crl0
  • http://www.microsoft.com/typography
  • http://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_arial.htmlhttp://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_welcome.htmlhttp://www.monotype.com/html/type/license.html

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