Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9d7ed344395f4722…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.58 MB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: 63e62d26c284155cf6e9746098399b7f SHA-1: 169ffea6414a8b0287209d12bb8329640a4b4b82 SHA-256: 9d7ed344395f4722c11d1017a4bc16f2136a9543a21f2ec82dd538b07617c13b
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor. Critical heuristics indicate exploitation of CVE-2017-8759, a vulnerability associated with MSXML SAX OLE activation. This suggests the document is designed to exploit this vulnerability upon opening, likely to download and execute a secondary payload. No specific family could be identified, but the attack pattern is consistent with document-based exploits.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0018af69.bin
93e39c6de45940bdd2950d0fa035d80b8203d48e34b7eec35b2a43f91c2f27bb		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x18AF69 3739 bytes

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