Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9d7b91043078affe…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

25.1 KB First seen: 2022-11-15
MD5: d3a9805317ca2a9f3f6800c07b000e9b SHA-1: e47014648eec9677817e08a57afb5c17a5c2775a SHA-256: 9d7b91043078affe9fb3f9c58535e765047c50ab4ea92412867e9615e7f80c7c
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, a known exploit technique. The \objupdate directive forces OLE activation, and the document includes a lure to enable editing, indicating an attempt to exploit a vulnerability. The embedded object is likely a payload dropper.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000041a7.bin
0cec24e58997c959442aa2bb39e91f1ad2b7619494224f6eee870a314d18d590
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x41A7 1953 bytes