Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9d7b30ac4a230bd3…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

586.0 KB First seen: 2026-05-11
MD5: 4b2ce351dbd43364275e5f19f7754178 SHA-1: 8e6fb3d0439f9e910126f6311e0771ed43e41f43 SHA-256: 9d7b30ac4a230bd3b1bd1c4755a56d9938a2482c407e93fa173ffc057c9a24ab
120 Risk Score

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE
    OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007+, AES-128)).
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.