Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9d5d4ef6ba4d7491…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

172.8 KB Created: 2020-03-26 16:42:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: f821b00e467d3133beba911b3cf271aa SHA-1: 026d9ad4f255db9c0450967fab31aecbc418a5df SHA-256: 9d5d4ef6ba4d7491c10a6bad913d5aab3ab584fa655e6565bf0276d1cd50c60b
260 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1204.002 Malicious File

The OOXML document contains VBA macros, specifically a Document_Open macro that utilizes WScript.Shell and CreateObject calls. This indicates an attempt to execute arbitrary code upon opening the document. The primary intent appears to be downloading and executing a second-stage payload, as suggested by the heuristic firings related to shell execution and suspicious extracted artifacts. The document body contains obfuscated text, likely to hide malicious intent.

Heuristics 7

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
d7510ccdbd2a83194df1b6b8ff7a7a1478c647b754c66137240f951b7d4be4c7		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 3663 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
4022b67ccff516a85e9fb70f0e232454631f447317c05fbf3be13e904e315f2c		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 17408 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.

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