Win.Trojan.Yaka-1 — Office (OLE) malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9d53136327ef2002…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

16.5 KB Created: 1997-08-23 09:20:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Word 6.0 First seen: 2012-06-14
MD5: 38e52eff219e40f0506f82cfa97fe770 SHA-1: ab5ea8a9fe4db0546b6e3b8c4f1944c47532952b SHA-256: 9d53136327ef2002d8ed4e8b9dada1f46e761bdfbf6acc2625577d2e9365a4ba
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Win.Trojan.Yaka-1 · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample exhibits legacy WordBasic macro virus markers, specifically 'ToolsMacro', and is flagged by ClamAV as Win.Trojan.Yaka-1. The embedded OLE content also shows suspicious static findings, indicating a high likelihood of malicious intent. The presence of legacy macro markers suggests an older, but still potentially effective, attack vector.

Heuristics 4

  • ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Yaka-1 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Trojan.Yaka-1
  • Embedded Office document has suspicious static findings critical EMBEDDED_OFFICE_CHILD_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A CFB/OLE Office document was found inside another file type and its carved contents matched Office exploit or payload heuristics. This catches wrapped exploit documents where the top-level file routes to a PE, archive, or generic scanner instead of Office.
  • Legacy WordBasic macro-virus markers high OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_MACRO_VIRUS
    OLE Word document contains legacy WordBasic auto-execution macro markers such as AutoOpen plus ToolsMacro/MacroFile/fileMacro/globMacro or named historical macro-virus strings. These old Word 6/95 macro forms are not exposed as a modern VBA project, so normal VBA source extraction can miss them.
  • CFB header with no readable streams medium OLE_PARSE_EMPTY_STREAMS
    The file begins with a valid OLE2/CFB header but exposes no directory streams. A non-empty compound document with an unreadable directory is anomalous — it is seen with truncated/corrupt files and, more importantly, with content deliberately shifted off byte boundaries to defeat parsers while the host application still recovers the object.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_office_off00001440.ole embedded-office Embedded OLE/CFB Office body inside ole container at offset 0x1440 11712 bytes
SHA-256: 48859d98f7b93b681acc3d9ce5a0105ad0b942e533e36fd995520c7efc994093