Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9d25a96a922dd6e9…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

327.5 KB
MD5: c0b62239c63e50361e5bab37ff75cb48 SHA-1: e67606d47bbda71d4e751ad7af4adfffb0ad4fe7 SHA-256: 9d25a96a922dd6e97f2a2e9ec2b0cdd14ed535a1a523a7ba41fcaa1fc60268e5
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a password-encrypted Office XLSX file. Heuristics indicate it contains an embedded OLE object, specifically the Equation Editor, which is a known exploit carrier. This suggests the document is intended to deliver a payload via a vulnerability in the Equation Editor component.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE
    OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007+, AES-128)).
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.