Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9d23624f1928d8b6…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

55.8 KB Created: 2021-02-01 21:02:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 60b63dc4a70aed1c339bf0f0e9f71e65 SHA-1: 55ac9f04933cf97eace713d774d6ddfb80f75e80 SHA-256: 9d23624f1928d8b6e612f672423e7e59c23b555c8c535c5fe5441f1205bc023c
202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1218.011 Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32

The sample contains a VBA macro that automatically executes via the Document_Open subroutine. This macro uses GetObject to instantiate the dangerous WScript.Shell COM object, which is a strong indicator of malicious intent to execute arbitrary code. The script likely downloads and executes a second-stage payload, as suggested by the use of WScript.Shell and the presence of obfuscated code that appears to be constructing commands.

Heuristics 6

  • VBA instantiates a dangerous COM class by CLSID critical OLE_VBA_GETOBJECT_CLSID_DANGEROUS
    VBA uses GetObject("new:{CLSID}") to instantiate an execution/scripting-capable COM class by its raw CLSID, avoiding the CreateObject ProgID that name-based detection keys on.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
0e303a2813579333de359491a45492c710ef9b33543a8a366f543f19c782b21f		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 9732 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
8b52282896d32e8bec9bc2d56203bb47d6479fb2a9e1b6a2bdf4bcdb22a7a50a		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 33792 bytes

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