Office (OLE) / .XLS malware analysis — malicious · 9d176ad14e9f84e1

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

937.5 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-08-09

MD5: 57ad72f6d421f40dd6c53ef4f43c228d SHA-1: ee53ea56b98f8e810681d456079c78ac75d21a3c SHA-256: 9d176ad14e9f84e1926e8c43969d9b08036dbd237afe7a9f5339b89dbb9fd23a

134 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample is an OLE file that exploits CVE-2017-0199 via a URL moniker to download a remote document. The embedded URL 'http://23.94.239.89/RCC/3/000000000000000%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23000000000000000000%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%230000000000%23%23%23%23%230.doc' is indicative of a downloader. Additionally, a secondary embedded PDF was found with suspicious static findings, suggesting a multi-stage attack.

Heuristics 6

OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199

Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE

A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS

Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE

PDF has 2 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL

The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://23.94.239.89/RCC/3/000000000000000%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23000000000000000000%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%230000000000%23%23%23%23%230.doc

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`macros.bas` `7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673`	vba-macro	oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source)	1206 bytes
`polyglot_child_pdf_off00000e00.pdf` `32e1718f98798e2fc9045b72a2ef5ed54387a5bc6e57bdd551a5be5ed3ea40f1`	polyglot-child-pdf	Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0xE00	956416 bytes
`polyglot_child_pdf_off00006a00.pdf` `cd9778a9cb77f1ddbbcb1dc7bdf2b82d47cbc75de7c497d321c44a15a4daa4d4`	polyglot-child-pdf	Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6A00	932864 bytes

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