Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9cf43b580f6ae1d7…

MALICIOUS

PDF

50.3 KB Created: 2020-07-30 00:46:27 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2026-05-09
MD5: fef62c60ac80c286dc87787ed4ffa155 SHA-1: fd613cf8b52cae72443907e1cb51a1b1a0b6bed9 SHA-256: 9cf43b580f6ae1d718dd85ccc6cd0c49c78a68e432a5c48ac68bab81e6ff5db7
294 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains an embedded script and multiple links, including one to a known malicious redirector at 'ttraff.com'. This redirector is likely used to obscure the final malicious destination. The document body and embedded script metadata suggest a lure related to 'automating administration with windows powershell pdf', likely a social engineering tactic to encourage clicks. The presence of a malicious redirector and embedded script indicates an attempt to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 8

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream high PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain script execution markers such as ActiveXObject/CreateObject, WScript.Shell, PowerShell, or shell-exec primitives. This is stronger than ordinary PDF JavaScript because it indicates a staged external script payload hidden in stream bytes.
  • Image lure linking to an SEO redirector (free-download phishing) high PDF_SEO_UTM_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF embeds an image with little or no body text and a clickable link to a multi-word utm_term / FeedBurner-proxied SEO redirector — the 'free ebook / solution-manual / document download' phishing family that ranks for natural-language search queries and routes the user into a payload/redirect chain. The PDF carries no exploit; the risk is the linked destination. Flagged structurally (image lure + SEO redirector) so it does not depend on a ClamAV/ML signature, and regardless of how many filler text pages the lure carries.
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/pify?keyword=10961+automating+administration+with+windows+powershell+pdf In PDF document text
    • http://files.wroughtbylight.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131409309/sadebu-zonefad.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.safna.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132680853/9128350.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.olneyartscouncil.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132696063/ferojorexuzolim_felesatanu_xukaribukowivev.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.mellinamathclass.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132712006/4781525.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0000851a.bin)
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0000851a.bin)
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/1996/8417/files/vitadagunulikajubane.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/6930/8061/files/wugemataxesu.pdfIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/0427/1524/files/50937934718.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0436/2482/4995/files/tugetoginojoguxubuwa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/6393/4105/files/gikexatulaboxutunorapafil.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/0742/7238/files/rojevunedeme.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/8907/5102/files/lujirirubixubokogiv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/81599599528.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/5417/7185/files/dokepekisuzipijapifilo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/8910/0951/files/kumuvixibibiwof.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/0896/6301/files/jimik.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/0378/1015/files/83334097763.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/8212/8283/files/66757281709.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/1996/8In macro / runtime command snippet
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0000851a.bin)

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_pdf_script_0000c3be.bin pdf-embedded-script PDF raw stream script payload at offset 0xC3BE 1681 bytes
SHA-256: 775369449a90efbbbd4effcefae58bb63cde89daaa7c9ca16d239cb4b85659a4
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 3 shell/COM execution token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
<?xpacket begin='' id='W5M0MpCehiHzreSzNTczkc9d'?>
<x:xmpmeta xmlns:x='adobe:ns:meta/' x:xmptk='ImageMagick'>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf='http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#'>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:dc='http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/'
  dc:format='application/pdf'>
  <dc:creator>
   <rdf:Seq>
    <rdf:li>Dugine Zanasixo</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Seq>
  </dc:creator>
  <dc:description>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>10961 automating administration with windows powershell pdf. This 5-day instructor-led course provides participants with the fundamental knowledge and skills of </rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:description>
  <dc:subject>
   <rdf:Bag>
    <rdf:li>10961 automating administration with windows powershell pdf. This 5-day instructor-led course provides participants with the fundamental knowledge and skills of </rdf:li>
   </rdf:Bag>
  </dc:subject>
  <dc:title>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>10961 automating administration with windows powershell pdf</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:title>
 </rdf:Description>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:pdf='http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/'
  pdf:Producer='ImageMagick'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmp='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/'
  xmp:CreateDate='2020-03-23T05:45:10'
  xmp:CreatorTool='ImageMagick'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpMM='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/'
  xmpMM:DocumentID='04caf599-f6b5-401d-a24c-9e26bbdb15ef'
  xmpMM:InstanceID='4d754ec8-829f-475d-a9be-155ec32f24bf'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpRights='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/'
  xmpRights:Marked='True'/>
</rdf:RDF>
</x:xmpmeta>
<?xpacket end='w'?>
font_00_sfnt_off0000851a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x851A 5836 bytes
SHA-256: 872aa73ba9c533751eaa0df9836dc31d0bc6f0de4d98284cf548f54191683d68
font_01_sfnt_off000098ce.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x98CE 10164 bytes
SHA-256: 0aa0865a0c74539461c4035a63586aa55a19f7f35a5a8a2f7c0a475674dcbc4a

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