Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9ce32ce5e2b70fec…

MALICIOUS

RTF

7.4 KB First seen: 2024-07-29
MD5: d0d1fba6bb7be933889ace0d6955a1d7 SHA-1: 97b1bf8f984ce9c17e48473409b9670741260ed5 SHA-256: 9ce32ce5e2b70fec7f749e7868d89a4e3e739fed9c75cd6c4ec6eafde4c3711a
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF file contains multiple indicators of exploiting the Equation Editor vulnerability, including critical heuristic firings for 'RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR' and 'RTF_OBJUPDATE'. These heuristics suggest the file is designed to trigger code execution via an embedded OLE object, a common technique for delivering secondary payloads. The presence of OLE object data further supports this attack vector.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000d0d.bin
8ed14d98f852e0feb3c6d5a8ad3a9bff3911a43de9d4c50d486cad5639c3c662
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xD0D 1811 bytes
objdata_01_off00000d4c.bin
5a99afd61f0fa864adab9da707388649e110d37d6e0c51cba0161730f1c79f07
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xD4C 36 bytes